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ABSTRACT
Colonialism and compromise:
The Shanghai Municipal Council and
the arrest of communists, 1927-1937
by
LAW Kwok Fai Peter
Master of Philosophy

Pressured by the Chinese authorities and the Foreign Office, the Shanghai
Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the Nationalist government on the
issue of the arrest of communists in the Settlement between 1927 and 1937. Planning
for a gradual retreat in the face of fervid Chinese nationalism, the British government
had no choice but to ask the Shanghai Municipal Council to satisfy the demands of
the Chinese. Meanwhile, confronted with the communist assassinations and open
assaults, the law and order in the International Settlement was under serious threat if
the Shanghai Municipal Council refused to cooperate with the Nationalists.
My research is a study of the cooperation between the Chinese authorities and the
Shanghai Municipal Police in arresting communists. The judicial autonomy of the
Settlement authorities was severely weakened following the use of three legal
processes involved in the treatments of communists, namely, arrest, extradition and
reformatory measures.
This topic has a policy implication. As one of the greatest colonial powers, Britain
used to exercise great influence around the world. Britain and her white settlers strive
for the survival of their informal empire in China at the expense of sacrificing their
judicial autonomy. My thesis offers a new conceptualisation and periodisation of
British decolonisation in East Asia.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“…I am not a criminal. The only thing that the law has against me is that I have other views of
government and so my offence is nothing other than political. On this offence if the government of this
country should sentence me to death I can have nothing to say in the matter. I admit that I am a
communist and I do not fear if the outcome is death for me.” 1
Jiang Cinan 蔣次南, the 3rd accused

This thesis tells the story of the weakened judicial independence of the Shanghai
International Settlement during the inter-war period. By doing so, I offer a broader
concept in studying the British decolonisation in the Far East. It challenges
prevailing understandings that decolonisation is defined based on the transfer of
sovereignty by examining the loss of the British judicial autonomy in China. I
attempt to discuss the role of the British imperial presence in modern China by
studying interplay between the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang, the
Shanghai Municipal Police and the British diplomatic bodies in the Shanghai
International Settlement during the early twentieth century. The arrest of communists
and its aftermath is the focus in my research. I will demonstrate two major directions
in this thesis. Not only will I argue that British imperial strategies in China were
changed following the strengthening of the Kuomintang, but I will also suggest that
the British decolonisation in East Asia was started in the mid-1920s.
The first argument raised in this thesis is about the readjustments of the British
imperialism in China. As John Darwin observes in his book The Empire Project,
British ruling strategies depended on realities and local circumstances in different
colonies although the British world-system still operated throughout the empire.
1

“Extract of proceedings in Shanghai Special District Court for 17th October, 1932” in Case against
Chien Tou Seu, ref. D4131, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944 (electronic
resources), records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Record Group 263, Farmington Hills, Mich.:
Gale, a part of Cengage Learning, 2010
1

Instead of imposing any single policy on all dependent territories, politicians at
Whitehall had to manage the empire based on local factors found in different colonies
such as religion, ethnicity, and regional interests.2 In other words, the British
government could just implement policies according to local circumstances in
different part of the Empire. Similarly, Edmund Fung and Robert Bickers illustrate
explicitly on how Britain responded to the challenge of the rising Chinese nationalism
in the Inter-war period. Edumnd Fung argues that the British Foreign Office
anticipated the gradual transfer of power from Britain to China provided that the
Kuomintang government could maintain a stable trading environment to foreign
commercial firms.3 He also states that the British diplomatic bodies were making a lot
of financial concessions to the Chinese government in the 1920s concerning the issue
of the treaty revision.4 In his work Britain in China, Bickers highlights localisation
policies adopted by the British government between the 1920s and 1940s. More
influential Chinese were appointed in senior positions of the Shanghai Municipal
Council, its police force, British enterprises and even church organisations.5 British
merchants also attempted to establish good relations with Kuomintang officials as well
as Chinese merchants.6 In short, the above authors try to examine the shift of British
policies in response to local conditions, especially looking at socio-economic changes
in the Republican China.
What this thesis contributes to the academic arena is to discuss the relinquishment of
2

John Darwin, The empire project: the rise and fall of the British world-system, 1830-1970
(Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3
3
Edmund S.K. Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat : Britain's South China policy, 1924-1931
(Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 1991), 172-173
4
Edmund Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991),
242
5
British firms hired more Chinese employees. Foreign staffs were even requested to learn Chinese.
See Robert Bickers, Britain in China: community, culture and colonialism 1900-1949, (Manchester :
New York : Manchester University Press, 1999), 158-210
6
Swire offered Song Ziwen 30 percent share of the China Navigation Company in 1935. See Robert
Bickers, Britain in China, 171-182
2

the legal autonomy of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force. I argue that
British foreign policies towards the Nationalist government had largely been redrafted
by the 1920s, changing from legal controls to the economic dominance in Shanghai.
Meanwhile, British expatriates in the early twentieth century Shanghai were
abandoned by the British metropole in a legal context. The judicial procedure
employed by the Shanghai Municipal Police and its Kuomintang counterparts in
handling communists is used as an example to illustrate how the loss of the judicial
independence and the policing power of the Shanghai International Settlement
connected to the readjustment of British imperial policies in the Far East. In fact, the
judiciary autonomy of the Settlement was of utmost importance in reflecting the
power and the sovereignty of the Shanghai Municipal Police and British expatriates.
Three legal processes including arrest, extradition and reformatory, which were
involved in handling communist suspects found in the International Settlement, could
show how the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the
Chinese authorities regarding the treatment of communists. With a view to
suppressing communism effectively, the Kuomintang demanded the Shanghai
Municipal Police for simplification of arrest procedures when arresting communists
hiding in the Settlement. Later, the Chinese authorities furthered requested the
Shanghai Municipal Council to extradite important communist convicts immediately
and to hand over communist prisoners to the Soochow reformatory. The above
demands violated legal procedures of the Settlement. Therefore, the Shanghai
Municipal Council’s permission in respond to the Kuomintang’s requests
demonstrated the transfer of legal power in Shanghai from the British authorities to the
Chinese government.
Meanwhile, surrendering the legal power of Britain in Shanghai to China
3

unavoidably led to conflict of interests between British settlers in Shanghai and
policy-makers in London. Indeed, it was true that British expatriates in Shanghai
shared the same Britishness with their kith and kin in Britain. In Empire and
globalization, Magee and Thompson study how cultural and ethnical influences
affected the integration of the global economy under the British dominance from the
mid-19th century to the eve of the First World War. The authors believe that cultural
significances provided private initiatives for white settlers to trade with each other in
the British Empire.7 Therefore, the unpopularity of communism in Britain mentioned
by Andrew Thorpe may also spread to other communities of white settlers in the
Empire during the inter-war years.8
Contradictions between different British interest groups were attributed to the nature
of the informal empire. As Jurgen Osterhammel observes, the informal empire
survived with the presence of political and business institutions whereas the formal
empire was under direct control from the British colonial authorities.9 In the case of
the British informal empire in China, the Chinese sovereignty was still respected to a
certain extent as Chinese territories were not formally annexed by Britain except
Hong Kong. China was still entitled with the rights to retain its own currency and
army, to draft its foreign policies, and to receive recognitions from other countries.10
Instead of managed by the Colonial Office, Shanghai and other treaty ports in China
had been governed by municipal governments managed by British expatriates under
the protection of the extraterritoriality since 1854. Given that these municipal

7

Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization: networks of people, goods
and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press,
2010)
8
Andrew Thorpe, The Failure of political extremism in inter-war Britain (Exeter : Dept. of History
and Archaeology, University of Exeter, 1989), 2-4
9
Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel, Imperialism and after: continuities and
discontinuities (London: German Historical Institute, 1986), 299, 307
10
Ibid, 290
4

governments were self-subsidised and only dealt with affairs relating to western
interest, treaty ports in China cost little financial burden to Britain.11 In Shanghai,
the British concession was amalgamated with other foreign concessions to form the
Shanghai International Settlement in the mid-19th century. [Appendix 1 shows the map
of Shanghai in the 1930s.] Subsequently, the Shanghai Municipal Council was found
as the local government of the International Settlement. [Please refer to appendix 2]
Yet, this Council, which was dominated by British members, was only responsible to
the interests of its multi-national taxpayers in the Settlement.12 Moreover, foreign
settlers in Shanghai even had their own armed forces to defend themselves. Founded in
1850s, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps maintained
the law and order inside the settlement.13 As a result, British subjects in China enjoyed
a very large degree of freedom. They could establish their own business companies
and missionary stations almost without any restrictions in Shanghai. Therefore, the
role of the British government in Shanghai was very limited. The British government
could provide diplomatic and military protection for their fellow subjects only if it
received requests from the Council.14 Therefore, municipal governments controlled
by white settlers in the informal empire had different considerations and calculation
compared to the British metropole.
Consequently, the relinquishment of the legal autonomy in Shanghai aroused
antagonism between the British government and British settlers in Shanghai. As John
Darwin states, it is a mistake to think that Whitehall policy-makers imposed the same
imperial policy on different dependent territories because of “variable costs and

11
12
13
14

P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British imperialism, 1688-2000 (New York: Longman, 2002), 363
Ibid, 168-169
Ibid, 166
Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 3
5

benefits for different sections of British society”.15 In fact, the British government
prepared for a gradual retreat from Shanghai in the 1920s. The two main concerns
that the British Foreign Office had were to prevent anti-British antagonism and to
retain the British economic influence in Shanghai.16 Facing the rise the Kuomintang
government, British officials realised that it was no longer possible to preserve the
Shanghai Settlement by force.17 But they refused to completely repudiate the
extraterritoriality and would not return the Shanghai Settlement to China
immediately. This was because British officials and entrepreneurs worried that the
progress of legal and political reforms implemented by the Kuomintang was still far
from meeting the Anglo-Saxon standard, causing unfavourable conditions for British
investments in China.18 Yet, the British Foreign Office recognised that if it did
nothing to please the Chinese public and the Kuomintang, anti-British strikes and
demonstrations could lead to further suspension of trades and heavy casualties.
Therefore, as Edmund Fung argues, the British government adopted the policy of
“combining conciliation with firmness” in Shanghai before returning the Settlement
to China.19 Whitehall policy-makers not only dispatched troops to defend Shanghai,
but it also gradually made political and legal concessions. By doing so, the British
authorities hoped that the Nationalist government could stop agitating any
anti-British activities in China and protected British economic interests in Shanghai.
With the support of British merchants, the British Foreign Office began to intervene
in the administration of the Settlement by pressuring the Shanghai Municipal Council

15

John Darwin, The empire project, 14
Edmund Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 5
17
Ibid, 7
18
G.W. Swire, The Possibilities of the Shanghai Negotiations, 14 th April, 1932, Avon Papers, 3;
“Enclosure No.II in H.M Minister’s despatch to F.O of 7 th June, 1929”, FO676/316, British Foreign
Office papers, 2
19
Edmund Fung, The diplomacy of imperial retreat, 10
6
16

to carry out various reforms alleviating anti-British feelings in Shanghai.20 In the
case of handling communists in the Shanghai Settlement, the British authorities were
sympathetic to the Kuomintang in suppressing communist activities in China not
only because of their hatred of communist disturbances, but also because of their fear
about the rise of the Kuomintang. This thesis shows how the British Foreign Office
intervened in the extradition of communist suspects who were also Chinese residents
protected by the Shanghai Municipal Council, and illustrates in what ways Britain
implemented Chinese penal regulations in the jails inside the Settlement. Hence,
Britain abandoned British expatriates by sacrificing the legal independence of the
International Settlement.
However, British settlers in Shanghai found it difficult to relinquish their legal
autonomy. As a part of colonial policing networks, the Shanghai Municipal Police
exchanged intelligence about the movements of notable communists with other
British military and police authorities. With a view to maintaining the law and order,
the Shanghai Municipal Police were even trustworthy partners of the Chinese
intelligence authorities in suppressing communist activities and anti-foreign
demonstrations. Under the command of the Special Branch chief T.P. Givens, the
Shanghai Municipal Police established a mutual understanding with Chinese agents
when arresting communists. Violations of settlement judicial procedures and legal
practices were very common to make arrests more effective and efficient. As
Georgina Sinclair argues, British laws and legal procedures were inapplicable in
colonies.21 Compared with their kith and kin in the British metropole, colonial police
officers in the empire experienced a different policing context because they served

20

Robert Bicker, Britain in China,116-117
Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80
(Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 5
7
21

the sovereign state rather than colonial subjects.22 Therefore, colonial policemen
tended not to abide by regular legal procedures since the survival of the British
imperial interest was more important.23 But the idea of imperial policing suggested
by Georgina Sinclair cannot directly be applied in the context of the British informal
empire in Shanghai. It was true that police forces could decide how to execute arrest
orders. Yet, it was necessary, if not essential, for police officers to seek instructions
from the higher authorities of the Settlement when they received requests from China
concerning political issues such as extradition and reformatory. Therefore, only by
studying the disappointments of British settlers can we truly realise the decline of the
British imperial presence in Shanghai.
After spending years living in Britain, many foreign settlers shared similar legal
spirits and policing ideas with their kith and kin at home.24 Coherence of judicial
values possessed by British expatriates echoes Gary B. Magee and Andrew S.
Thompson’s idea concerning the pan-imperial and cultural unity among British
migrants overseas.25 In fact, the British policing developed along the line of
Anglo-Saxon tradition that “the law reflected the will of the people, which every free
man had an obligation to uphold” and differed from the Roman beliefs emphasised

22

Ibid, 2
Ibid, 7
24
Dr. Kiebtner, former adviser to Jiang Jieshi, stated that the institutional differences of the police
systems between the two foreign concessions and China caused conflicts between the Chinese
authorities and the International Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Police arrested the communists
based on evidence, whereas the Chinese policemen could apprehend someone based on reasonable
suspicions." See “Interview with Dr. Von Kiebtner" in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie
Gongbujuzongbanchu Youguan Jingwuchu Guanyu Kelaina Boshi Fabiao Guanyu Guomindang
Zhengfu He Jiang Jieshi Dui Shanghaizujie Taidu De Tanhua De Baogao (1929-1930) [上海公共租
界工部局總辦處有關工部局警務處關於克萊納博士發表關於國民黨政府和蔣介石對上海租界態
度的談話的報告 (1929-1930)] [Report made by the Shanghai Municipal Police concerning Dr.
Kiebtner on the attitude of the Nationalist Government and Jiang Jieshi towards in the International
Settlement] in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930, ref.: U1-6-22, 30th
December, 1929 (Shanghai: Unpublished document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive), 1-3
25
Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalization : networks of people, goods
and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914, (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press,
2010)
8
23

on controlling social stability by a “centralised force”.26 With the progress of
democracy in Britain, the police system in the metropole had to further reform itself
in order to recognise the evolution of civil citizenship in the 19th century.27 Indeed,
British expatriates in Shanghai were entrenched in the above judicial perception.
Many British settlers, including Municipal Advocates, the Council Secretary, and
even some senior police officers were keen to uphold the British traditional legal
system in the settlement. They blamed the Shanghai Municipal Police and the
Kuomintang for subverting formal legal procedures and practices in handling the
communists under the jurisdiction of the settlement. In their perspectives, violation
of legal procedures not only caused injustice on the accused, but it also challenged
the judicial integrity of the International Settlement. As a consequence, British
expatriates were discontented that their legal autonomy was weakened by the British
Foreign Office and the Kuomintang.
In addition, British pressure groups also worked against their home government.
Antoinette Burton stresses that socio-political debates in Britain were framed by
imperial issues. Pressure groups drew upon imperial matters in order to urge their
home government to reform. Burton argues that primary intentions of domestic
campaigners were to ‘evaluate the successes and failures of Anglo-Saxon values and
“colonial” projects’.28 Similarly, Andrew Thompson discusses how pressure groups
and the media in Britain drew the parliament’s attention to the empire in the 19th and
20th century.29 This thesis illustrates how the Howard League for Penal Reform and

26

Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80
(Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 4
27
Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line: colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945-80
(Manchester; New York : Manchester University Press, 2006), 5
28
Antoinette Burton, Empire in question: reading, writing, and teaching British imperialism
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 264
29
Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: the empire in British politics, c. 1880-1932 (Harlow,
England ; New York : Longman, 2000)
9

the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence highlighted the
limitations of the British and the Settlement authorities when dealing with the
extradition and the imprisonment of communist suspects. To conclude, British
settlers in Shanghai were abandoned by the British government as they could no
longer enjoy their legal autonomy in the International Settlement.
The second issue that I attempt to renegotiate is concerning the periodisation of the
British decolonisation. I argue that the 1920 decade was the beginning of the British
decolonisation in Asia. Prevailing understandings on the term decolonisation mainly
refers to the change of flags in colonies. Different national flags replaced the Union
Jack, flying at different government offices. In accordance of John Darwin, the final
stage of the British decolonisation only took place when Britain transferred its
political sovereignty back to its colonial subjects in the post-war era. Failing to
exercise effective political control on the Empire, the British imperial presence
eventually came to an end in the 1950s and the 1960s.30 Apart from Darwin, many
scholars also put their focus on the post-war period when studying the topic about the
western decolonisation. Ronald Hyam in his book Britain’s Declining Empire
attributes the inevitability for the collapse of the British Empire to several post-war
factors such as rising nationalism in colonies and the Cold War.31 Similarly, John
Springhall suggests that nationalism and international pressure led to the downfall of
the western imperialism after 1945.32
Yet, I am inclined to show my agreement with Robert Bickers who suggests that
the origins of the British decolonisation should be traced back to the inter-war period,

30

John Darwin, Britain and decolonisation : the retreat from empire in the post-war world (New
York : St. Martin's Press, 1988), 6
31
Ronald Hyam, Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968, (Cambridge ;
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006)
32
John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: the collapse of European overseas empires ,
(Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave, 2001)
10

especially in the late 1920s.33 Apart from its political definition, decolonisation can
also be understood in a cultural point of view. According to “Rethinking
Decolonization”, A. G. Hopkins highlights that white dominions only obtained full
independence from Britain when they abolished their socio-economic connections to
their Kith and Kin in Britain after the Second World War. During the inter-war period,
white dominions became politically autonomous after agreements were signed
between themselves and Britain in the 1920s. However, white dominions still
economically and culturally linked to the British metropole.34 Thus, Hopkins argues
that such status was not a complete independence for these dominions. Instead, the
actual decolonisation found in white dominions has only begun since the 1960s,
when British cultures connecting Britain and its dominions became less significant.
Not only were white settlers deprived of British citizenships, but their courts also
stopped appealing to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.35 The British
monarchy had only symbolic meaning towards white dominions. Consequently, the
British decolonisation in white dominions was fully accomplished when white
settlers finally relinquished their cultural concept of Britishness and developed their
own national identities.36
Likewise, the forfeit of the British judicial independence in the Shanghai
Settlement signified the beginning of the British decolonisation in the early 20th
century China. Since the rise of the Nationalist government in the late 1920s, white
settlers in Shanghai had been deprived of their own jurisdiction to handle
communists found in the Settlement. With a view to eliminating political rivalries of
the Kuomintang, the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police forces had to
33

Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 18
A. G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization" in Past and Present, August 2008 (Vol. 200, No. 1),
218
35
Ibid, 229
36
Ibid, 235
11
34

relinquish their British legal values when dealing with sensitive cases relating to
communism. The Settlement Police started to ignore warrants details stated by the
court to arrest communists. More importantly, the Council not only extradited its
own residents engaging in communists activities to the Chinese authorities, but it
also handed over its “repented” and “non-repented” prisoners to the Soochow
reformatory. Therefore, these actions violated British legal and policing values which
respected the will of the people, the rule of law, and the humanitarianism.37 As a
result, the failure of British settlers to uphold their judiciary values unavoidably
signified partial disappearance of Britishness, resulting in the British decolonisation
in a legal context.

British imperial policing in Shanghai
The imperial policing also forms an indispensable part relating to the British
imperialism. I argue that collaboration with a foreign country was one of the ways for
police forces in different colonies to maintain social stabilities during the British
decolonisation. Many historians study how imperial police forces reacted when the
British supremacy was challenged by colonial subjects. In accordance with Charles
Jeffries, the imperial policing was mixed with military component when existence of
colonial regimes was under threat. The semi-military model of the Royal Irish
Constabulary in Ireland was widely used to suppress disturbances and wars
threatening the British imperial presence in the inter-war period.38 When the Second
World War was over, Britain even invested more resources in policing its empire
where independence movements prevailed. In Policing and decolonisation, David
Anderson and David Killingray state that the Colonial Office began to centralise

37

Georgina Sinclair, At the end of the line, 4-5; William Forsythe, The reform of prisoners,
1830-1900 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 8-13
38
Charles Jeffries, The colonial police (London: M. Parrish, 1952), 32
12

police forces overseas, carrying out institutional reforms to strengthen its control
towards colonial policemen.39 Meanwhile, the police authorities also set up special
branches to collect intelligence, working with Security Services (MI5) in the United
Kingdom to suppress anti-British activities.40 Similarly, Georgina Sinclair argues that
the power of colonial police forces rose rapidly during post-war period. With a view to
protecting the imperial presence in the face of high-tide nationalism, colonial police
officers obtained more autonomy in developing intelligence and military precaution
measures.41 Hence, the above authors mainly concentrate on studying uses of force
and the intelligence gathering of the colonial police during the British decolonisation
in post-war period.
Alternatively, I suggest that the collaboration between the Shanghai Municipal
Police and the Kuomintang was another way to suppress communism in the British
Empire. Instead of the Shanghai Municipal Police, the Kuomintang had become the
real authority enjoying the “escalation” of police power in the settlement since the
1920s. Facing the pressure from the Chinese authorities, the Shanghai Municipal
Council reluctantly violated legal procedures. However, the Shanghai Municipal
Police were very keen to facilitate arrests of communists. Indeed, the Shanghai
Municipal Police shared lots of similarities with its counterparts in other British
dependent territories. Composed of approximately 6,200 police officers and clerical
supernumeraries from China, Japan, India, and western countries, the Settlement
Police was under the command of the Shanghai Municipal Council dominated by the
British. Senior ranks were predominately filled by the Europeans.42 These policemen
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also shared similar anti-communist sentiments with other British imperial police
forces overseas.43 Thus, arresting communists was necessary in order to protect
British interests in Shanghai.
Yet, the Shanghai Municipal Police took a more active initiative to suppress
communist activities in the Settlement compared to their bosses in the Council. As
David Anderson and David Killingray note, police forces not only had to defend
interests of propertied classes, but they also had to maintain social stabilities.44 The
Kuomintang regime had persecuted communists in China since the death of Dr. Sun
Zhongshan in 1925. The actions that illustrate the Kuomintang’s determination in
eliminating communists were its military campaigns encircling and exterminating
communist troops 剿匪 led by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 and Zhude 朱德 in rural areas
during the early 1930s.45 In urban area, under the commands of the Nationalist
government and the Green Gang leader Du Yuesheng 杜月笙, gangsters based in the
French concession passed through the International Settlement and eventually purged
all communist societies in Zhabei 閘北 area in early 1927.46 The Shanghai
International Settlement, which enjoyed a status of political neutrality, became a
refuge for communists to hide. As a consequence, communist activities had become
one of the festering problems in Shanghai since the mid 1920s. Many strikes and
demonstrations agitated by communist members created disturbances in the
International Settlement. S. A. Smith illustrates the efforts of communists in agitating
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the mass to openly revolt against warlords and the colonial authorities in the early
1920s. He also discusses the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party in creating
disturbances in the May Thirtieth incident and armed uprisings against warlords in
Shanghai.47 In her work Underground, Patricia Stranahan further argues that
changing communist strategies in Shanghai were a result of political persecutions by
the Kuomintang. Communists began to abandon original Marxist idea advocated by
the Commintern, ingratiating themselves with other patriotic organisations to establish
united fronts in Shanghai against the Kuomintang and imperialists.48 Worse still, the
massacres of some communist traitors’ family by the Red Brigade even exposed
significant security crisis in two foreign concessions, creating embarrassments and
challenges to the foreign police authorities in the early1930s.49
With a view to safeguarding the law and order in the settlements, both the
Shanghai Municipal Police and the French Concession Police decided to ally with
the Kuomintang to arrest communists at all cost.50 The settlement authorities not
only exchanged confidential intelligence with the Chinese authorities, but they also
allowed Chinese agents to join Settlement policemen in conducting raids on
communist bases. More importantly, the Shanghai Municipal Police even violated
legal procedures when arresting communists even though such practice contradicted
to the will of the Council in defending the legal integrity of the Settlement. During
arrests, police officers ignored the content stated in warrants and sometimes even
apprehended suspects without first applying for warrants from the court. Therefore,
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the collaboration between the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Kuomintang in
arresting communists could benefit both the Settlement and the Chinese authorities in
maintaining social stabilities in Shanghai.

The Kuomintang and the strengthening of China
Apart from looking at the British perspective, this thesis also has an implication on
the history of modern China. I argue that the rise of republican China in the late
1920s appeared in the form of diplomatic interventions, dominating municipal
administrations and the legal structure of the Shanghai International Settlement. After
the completion of the northern expedition by General Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石 in 1927, the
Nanjing government pushed hard to modernise China with a view to repealing the
extraterritoriality. Shanghai was one of test points for the Nationalist government to
modernise the country. In the existing literature about the history of republican China,
historians mainly concentrate on how the Kuomintang attempted to strengthen the
whole country through increasing its control in societies internally.
The Kuomintang consolidated its political power in Shanghai by establishing its
city government. Christian Henriot illustrates the modernisation of municipal
administrations in the Kuomintang controlled Shanghai in 1920s and 1930s.51 In
"Designing China's urban future", Kerrie L. MacPherson shows how the Greater
Shanghai Plan 大上海計劃 had been advocated since the 1910s. A modern urban
planning was an evidence to show China’s determination in restructuring the country
and counteracting foreign influences in Shanghai.52 Only by creating a modernised
Chinese municipality could justify the ability of the Chinese government to recover
the Shanghai International Settlement and the French Concessions in the future.
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Meanwhile, the Kuomintang also attempted to infiltrate its influence into foreign
concessions through an informal way. In The Shanghai Green Gang states that the
Chinese authorities inwardly allied with a triad society called the Shanghai Green
Gang 上海青幫, controlling labour class people in two foreign concessions.
The Nationalist government also tightened its control in socio-economic aspects.
Economically, the Kuomintang exerted its influence in the financial sector of the
country. Zheng Huixin 鄭會欣 examines the Kuomintang’s attempt to modernise the
economy of China by carrying out fiscal reforms, clearing debts and seeking for
foreign assistances.53 Parks Coble studied how the Nationalist government decided to
emasculate the political power of the Chinese capitalists and to develop the
modernisation of economic sectors in Shanghai under its supervision.54 On the other
hand, the Chinese authorities imposed social regulations on the public based on
western models. Penal reform was one of the ways to modernise China. In his book
Crime, punishment, Frank Dikötter discusses the evolution of the Chinese penal
system from the late Qing period to the end of the republican era. In particular, he
studies significances of changing cultural and social customs of prisons in modern
China. The establishment of the reformatories and the restructuring of prisons were
reformative means used by the Nanjing government to re-educate its fellow
countrymen who were always regarded as uncivilised in the eyes of westerners.55
The Chinese judiciary and policing system also experienced reforms when Jiang
Jieshi rose to power. As Frederic Wakeman observes in Policing Shanghai, the
53
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Nationalist government attempted to reform the Chinese police system in Shanghai by
learning from western legal models.56 But he also attributes the failure of the
modernisation of the social institution in Shanghai to the “lamentable durability of
governmentalised autocracy” under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi.57 Yao Yuan
examines legal mechanisms of the Shanghai Provisional Court and the Shanghai
Special District Court under the control of the Kuomintang, showing the gradual
cancellation of western judicial privileges in the Shanghai International Settlement.58
Instead of studying the internal strengthening of republican China, this thesis
attempts to examine in what ways the Kuomintang used diplomatic means to elevate
the international reputation of the Republic of China and to achieve its political
motives in the 1920s and 1930s. The International Settlement was under threat if the
Shanghai Municipal Council refused to cooperate with the Chinese authorities. The
Kuomintang could utilise anti-foreign sentiments to their advantage in coercing the
Settlement authorities and even demanding for immediate relinquishment of the
extraterritoriality possessed by foreign expatriates. Pressured by the British Foreign
Office, the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise with the
Nationalist government concerning arrests of communists in the Settlement between
1927 and 1937. As a result, warlord Wu Peifu 吳佩孚 of Zhili clique 直系 and
later the Nationalist government successfully pressured Britain and other western
powers to review the agreements of the unequal treaties accepted by the Qing Court.
Diplomats from western countries eventually signed two rendition agreements with
China in 1926 and 1930 relating to the repudiation of some western legal privileges
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in Shanghai. Not only did the Shanghai International Settlement have to gradually
return the Shanghai Mixed Court to China, but it abided also by the Chinese law
codes and relevant prison regulations. Indeed, this could externally raise the
reputation of China in the international stage. More importantly, this diplomatic
victory also provided the Kuomintang with legitimacy to suppress its political
rivalries through implementing Chinese law codes in foreign concessions and
controlling the Settlement courts.
As a result, the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force were forced to
satisfy the political motives of the Kuomintang regime at the expense of their judicial
autonomy and British legal values. The Settlement authorities were enthusiastic in
arresting communists not only because communists had detrimental effects on
British commercial interests in Shanghai, but also because they were political
rivalries of the Kuomintang. Therefore, although the British Foreign Office didn't
physically return the settlement to the Nationalist government, its compromise
concerning the transformation of the settlement court under predominant influence of
the Chinese government would unavoidably serve the Kuomintang's desire in
eliminating its political counterparts. The following chapters show the Shanghai
Municipal Police arresting people based on the Chinese criminal codes 中華民國刑
法, extraditing communist suspects to the Chinese authorities in accordance with the
decision made by Chinese judges, and handing over communist prisoners to
Soochow reformatory according to the regulations governing reformatories 反省院
條例. It was true that the Kuomintang was able to recover its judicial power from
Britain and successfully accomplished its political intentions in foreign concessions
through diplomatic means. Hence, diplomacy took an important role in suppressing
communist activities in the International Settlement during the Nanjing decade.
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This thesis is divided into two parts. Chapter 2 gives an overview of complex
political conditions in Shanghai and the changing Sino-British relations in the early
20th century. I discuss how the paralysation of foreign trade by Chinese nationalism
altered the attitude of the British Foreign Office towards the future of Shanghai. Then,
I address in what ways the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to compromise
with China concerning the transformation of the judicial system in the settlement
under the pressure of the British metropole. The judicial reconstruction in foreign
concessions in the late 1920s was the backdrop for arrests of communists. The second
part of this thesis illustrates legal procedures concerning apprehensions of communists
and its aftermath. In Chapter 3, the increasing internal violence in the International
Settlement compelled the Shanghai Municipal Police to cooperate with the Chinese
authorities to apprehend communists by ignoring details stated in court warrants.
Arrests were almost carried out based on mere suspicions of the Chinese intelligence
officers. Chapter 4 reveals the surrender of the International Settlement’s jurisdiction
power to China in cases about communist extraditions. The Shanghai Municipal
Council was deprived of its legal capacity to defend its Chinese residents and its own
judicial authority in the settlement. The role of the British diplomatic bodies in
extradition cases are also examined here. Chapter 5 explores that the Shanghai
Municipal Gaol functioned in line with Chinese prison regulations not only by
allowing Kuomintang delegates to examine prisoners’ thoughts, but also by sending
their convicts to the Soochow reformatory 蘇州反省院 established for reshaping
ideologies of political offenders. British penal values emphasising humanitarian
treatments were therefore abandoned.
The steady release of sources in the Shanghai Municipal Archive 上海市檔案館
allows me to explore further for this sensitive topic. Some of the internal
20

correspondences between the council secretary, senior officers of the police force and
the municipal advocate allowed me to understand their original judicial values and
political motives in response to Chinese requests. Police daily reports and intelligence
reports also provided me with an overview about arrest processes and individual
judgments made by the settlement court. Special Branch files available in National
Archives and Records Administration of the United States also facilitate my research.
The annual reports of the Shanghai Municipal Council found in the special collection
department of the University of Hong Kong provided me with basic information
regarding structures of municipal institutions and criminal figures in the Settlement.
Memoirs of communists convicts can be found in the Shanghai Library 上海圖書館,
describing contrasts between being imprisoned in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol and
being incarcerated in the Soochow Reformatory.
Materials stored in the United Kingdom were useful in realising the mentalities of
British diplomats. Foreign Office papers kept in the National Archives at Kew and in
Adam Matthew online database illustrate actions and considerations of the British
government towards the treaty revision and some individual cases of communist
arrests in the International Settlement. The Cadbury Research Library of the
University of Birmingham has a good collection of Chamberlain family papers, of
which Austen Chamberlain’s private papers revealed the determination of Whitehall
policy-makers and British businessmen to retain British economic interests in
Shanghai at the expense of some privileges.
Last but not least, the Ministry of Justice of the Bureau of Investigation 法務部調
查局 in Taiwan (the Republic of China) keeps some memoirs and reports of those
Chinese intelligence officers involved in apprehending communists during their
collaborations with the Shanghai Municipal Police in the 1920s and 1930s. Their
21

testimonies can illustrate how increasing communist assassinations in the settlement
had forced the municipal police to cooperate with the Chinese authorities without any
hesitations by early 1930s. Insistence of the Settlement Police on formal legal
procedures before the occurrence of the security crisis could be shown in these
memoirs as well. There were miscellaneous telegrams and dispatches written between
Jiang Jieshi and his subordinates showing details of different individual communist
cases in the Academia Historica 國史館 and the Kuomintang Archive 中國國民黨
黨史館 in Taibei 臺北.
To conclude, this thesis examines how Britain and her white settlers strive for the
survival of their interests in China through sacrificing their judicial autonomy in
Shanghai. It is hoped that this thesis can provide new conceptualisation and
periodisation of British decolonisation in East Asia.
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CHAPTER 2
THE KUOMINTANG, CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND
THE SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, 1927-1937
“The more gradually the changes are made and the more willingly reforms are introduced, the more
secure will be the interests of the settlement and the better its relations with the Chinese
authorities.”59
Sir Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

In spite of the fact that the Chinese formed a large population and contributed a
large sum of revenue to the British concessions, the Shanghai Municipal Council
mainly concerned foreign interests and ignored ordinary Chinese people. Neither did
Chinese children enjoy educational opportunities in the Settlement, nor were Chinese
workers protected by any industrial ordinances. More importantly, the 1920 decade
made a drastic change in socio-political conditions in China and threatened the
survival of the British informal empire. Despite the establishment of the Republic of
China in 1912, continuous diplomatic defeats and internal political fragmentations
led to instabilities and anti-foreign sentiments in China since the late 1910s. An array
of incidents such as the Japanese succession on the German sphere of influence in
Shandong and the bloodshed between different warlords further aroused the
awareness of Chinese citizens about the safety of their own country. With a view to
saving their motherland, Chinese intellectuals introduced many western thoughts to
modernise their country during the May Fourth Movement in 1919.60 Communism,
which was regarded as one of “remedies” to cure wounds of China, was advocated
59
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by some pioneers such as Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, Li Dachao 李大釗. They were
motivated by the success of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917.61 Thus, the
Chinese Communist Party was found in a context of strong national sentiment in
1921 and became one of main characters appearing in this thesis.
Triggered by the municipal police’s suppressions on Chinese civilians on May
thirtieth [Please refer to appendix 3], the fervid Chinese nationalism caused
disturbances in the Shanghai international settlement. Consequently, a shooting
incident ended up with huge casualties. Strikes, boycotts and even assassinations
occurred frequently in 1925 and 1926. Western enterprises in China became chief
targets attacked by the Chinese. When Jiang Jishi rose to power in China, he even
promised to Chinese merchants that he was going to “restore the Settlement within
three years”. Worse still, communists even made good use of the Chinese nationalism
to initiate more mass demonstrations and even murdering cases. Therefore, during
the 1920s and 1930s, the turmoil in Shanghai not only paralysed British-invested
factories and companies, but it also created anxieties and strains among British
communities.62 Meanwhile, after the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1927,
the warlord era ended and China was unified by Jiang Jieshi. The Nationalist
government therefore could concentrate its effort in abolishing foreign concessions
recognised by the former Qing Court. Such circumstances marked the shift of British
foreign policies in China.
Confronted with unfavourable circumstances, the British Foreign Office planned
for readjustments of imperial policies in China. In 1929, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Austen Chamberlain instructed his colleagues that “The more gradually the
61
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changes are made and the more willingly reforms are introduced, the more secure
will be the interests of the settlement and the better its relations with the Chinese
authorities.”63 Apparently, Austen Chamberlain believed that the Sino-British
relations and foreign interests in China could only be secured by introducing gradual
reforms and changes in the Settlement. As a result, the Shanghai Municipal Council
not only drastically raised the number of Chinese members in the Council, but it also
implemented the Chinese criminal codes and procedures in the Settlement in the late
1920s. The British Foreign Office even compromised with the Nationalist
government to cancel the companion of the Consular deputy in the Court afterwards.
Therefore, the Settlement could not openly oppose decisions made by Chinese judges
who were appointed by the Chinese government later on. Further to the above
concessions, the Chinese authorities even wanted the Settlement to provide more
convenience and concession in dealing with arrests of communists and its aftermath.
In the existing literature, scholars have been pushing hard to investigate the
internal turmoil in China during the 1920s and inter-war British foreign policies in
the Far East. Nevertheless, rarely do they connect the above two aspects in the
context of the Shanghai International Settlement. Concerning Nationalist and
communist activities in Shanghai, Stranahan and Smith attempt to explain general
communist strategies and tactics in counteracting the Kuomintang and the Settlement
authorities. Making good use of the fervid Chinese nationalism, Chinese communists
in Shanghai initiated mass demonstrations, strikes and even assassinations in order to
paralyse the Settlement.64 Wang Fuqun studies tactics adopted by the Kuomintang
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agents to counteract communist underground activities.65 The strengthening of the
Kuomintang in Shanghai is also well-noted by other scholars. Parks Coble
demonstrates how the Nationalist government emasculated the political power of
Chinese capitalists and fostered the modernisation of economic sector in Shanghai.66
Christian Henriot depicts that the transformation of municipal administrations in
Kuomintang controlled Shanghai was under the surveillance of the Settlement
authorities in the 1920s and 1930s.67 Frederic Wakeman also illustrates the
Nationalists government’s attempt to reform the police force in Shanghai based on
western models.68 However, the above authors never reveal to what extent these
patriotic activities, either led by the Kuomintang or communists, affected British
diplomatic policies in China.
Another field that scholars have paid much attention is about British foreign
policies in the Far East during the inter-war period. Peter Lowe mentions the British
declining power in the Far East forced Britain to give much concession to the
Nationalist government.69 Whilst studying British diplomacy in Southern China,
Edumnd Fung suggests that the British Foreign Office anticipated the gradual
transfer of power from Britain to China in the 1920s provided that the Kuomintang
government could maintain a stable trading environment to foreign firms.70
Nevertheless, neither Peter Lowe nor Edumnd Fung illustrates how Chamberlain’s
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conciliatory attitude influenced the governance of the Shanghai Municipal Council.
Although Robert Self briefly mentions the conciliatory attitude of Chamberlain
concerning the treaty revision issue of the international settlement, he does not
explain Chamberlain’s goal and methods behind the scene.71 Meanwhile, Antony
Best also shows how the spread of communism in the Far East aroused great
attention of British intelligence departments apart from the Japanese expansion in
China.72 But again, Shanghai is not the focus of Antony Best. Nicholas R. Clifford
shows how Westerners in Shanghai survived in the face of the Chinese revolution in
the 1920s.73 Yet, how the British authorities dealt with arrests of communists in the
International Settlement is still not explored.
Reforms that the Shanghai Municipal Council adopted in the face of the fervid
Chinese nationalism have been largely neglected in the academic arena. Yao Yuan
examines gradual cancellations of western judicial privileges in the Settlement legal
framework. The Shanghai Provisional Court and the Shanghai Special District Court
were used as her examples.74 Besides, Robert Bickers illustrates how British settlers
gradually surrendered their powers to the Chinese since the 1920s. Nevertheless,
Bickers primarily studies the localisation of British commercial and religious
institutions in China instead of the transformation of political and legal aspects.75
Yet, how did concessions made by the British authorities favour the Kuomintang to
arrest Chinese communists?
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In my opinion, it was necessary, if not essential that the British government had to
allow the Chinese influence to penetrate into the Shanghai International Settlement in
the 1920s. Thus, I elaborate further on the argument raised by Robert Bickers who
emphasises the role of the British Foreign Office in seizing the British settlers’ power
in Shanghai after the 1920s. There is no doubt that the British Empire in China
survived at the expense of British settlers’ interests.76 Chapter two reveals the goals
of Whitehall policy makers and methods involved in its formation. An overview
about the background of politics in Shanghai and the Sino-British relations in the
early 20th century is shown here. I first discuss how the Chinese nationalism
paralysed foreign trades in Shanghai. The second section demonstrates the attitude of
the British Foreign Office in handling the turmoil in Shanghai. Lastly, the final
section addresses in what ways the Shanghai Municipal Council made political and
judicial concessions to the Chinese public resulting from the pressure given by
Britain.
Nationalist and communist activities in Shanghai
Located in the mouth of the Yangtze River, Shanghai had great significance for
British entrepreneurs in the 19th and the 20th century. Several examples can illustrate
the above statement. Shanghai had an import figure of 548,607,889 Hk. Taels and an
export figure of 362,220,148 Hk. Taels in 1928.77 There were twenty-three shipping
companies in Shanghai, seven of which were British companies.78 Therefore,
Shanghai contributed a lot for British settlers to earn substantial amount of income in
China.
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Nevertheless, the prosperity of British trade was seriously threatened by the
intensification of anti-foreign sentiments in China. The seeds of Chinese nationalism
had already been sowed in China before the early 20th century. According to
Madeline Hsu, many Chinese reformers began to publish revolutionary and reformist
journal articles and Qiaokan (僑刊, magazines for overseas Chinese) in the late Qing
era to advocate western educations, the idea of self-government (自治) and western
reforms in existing government bodies.79 The Ningbo vernacular (寧波白話報), for
instance, was circulated by Shanghai native place associations which aimed to
establish a modern China.80 Worse still, the First World War further stirred up
national sentiments in China. More Chinese people became anti-foreign not only
because of the national self-determination principle advocated by Woodrow Wilson,
but also because of the Japanese succession to the German sphere of influence in the
Shandong province.81 Under these circumstances, the May Thirtieth Incident, which
caused heavy casualties for Chinese protestors near the Louza Police station in
Shanghai, further aroused the antagonism between Chinese and foreign communities
in China. Chinese editors in Shanghai strongly condemned the Shanghai Municipal
Council in newspapers and refused to publish the municipal news.82
Subsequently, stimulated by the above factors, nationalist activities in China were
more organised than before. Frequent strikes initiated by different labour societies
not only disturbed the municipality but also interrupted trades in Shanghai.83
Electricity in the city was cut off as a result of strikes agitated by Chinese employees
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of the electricity department.84 Apart from British mills and factories in Shanghai,
British shipping companies also suffered serious deficit during strikes. Not only were
loading and unloading procedures suspended, but maintenance works for British
freighters also came to a halt. Thus, import and export of British cargos in Shanghai
were terminated. Costs for storing goods also increased.85 The British Foreign
Office was even told that under such condition, “substantial orders for Manchester
and Bradford goods have been given to German firms.”86 Apart from writing
communist slogans on the walls in the public area,87 communists were keen to
agitate workers to participate in labour strikes by disseminating inflammatory
pamphlets everywhere in the Settlement. Daung Ling Sung and Yu Ts Yu, who were
employees of the Oriental Cotton Mill, 36 Yangtszepoo Road, were apprehended for
posting inflammatory handbills in premises of that factory.88
Another means adopted by the Chinese public went against foreign expatriates in
China was to boycott western commodities. Perhaps the 1925 annual report of the
Council can describe how tense the situation was at that time.

Chinese dealers were warned that British and Japanese goods found in their
shops would be liable to confiscation and shipping companies were
notified that coolies would refuse to handle boycotted goods. These
decrees were enforced by parties of students who examined goods in stores
and at wharves and railway stations.89
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The British American Tobacco Company, whose stocks was seized and sealed up by
Chinese mobs, experienced at least 40% loss for their total business amount in
1925.90 The deterioration of British economic interests was largely attributed to
hysterical nationalist activities in Shanghai during the 1920s.
Worse still, intimidations on foreigners also paralysed business activities. In 1925,
59 foreigners and 25 Chinese were attacked by protesters in the form of murders,
robbery, kidnappings, assaults and threatening letters. Sailors of British ships were
even singled out for persecution.91 Agents of British sugar companies were even
intimidated by Chinese students and were forced to pay fines to the Chinese
authorities.92 With a view to eliminating party traitors and nationalist agents, the red
brigade of the Chinese Communist Party had been established before the 1930s.
Ironically, some innocent civilians in the Settlement were even accidentally killed by
the Red brigade.93 Therefore, the safety of foreigners was under serious threat.
As a result, trades and investments in Shanghai were seriously disturbed by the
fervid Chinese nationalism. Foreigner merchants, especially British businessmen,
suffered heavy economic loss. Thus, consequences of the Chinese nationalism on
foreign trades triggered the British authorities and the municipal council to readjust
their policies in China and Shanghai respectively.
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The future of the Shanghai International Settlement
The future of the International Settlement had become more unpredictable and
worrying since the late 1920s. After defeating different warlords, the Kuomintang
under Jiang Jieshi’s leadership eventually completed the northern expedition
北伐 and eventually unified China under a single regime. The event that signified
the rise of China was the Kuomintang’s recovery on the Hankou 漢口 concession.
Confronted with massive Chinese demonstrators and Kuomintang supporters, Royal
Marines soldiers were forced to evacuate British subjects in Hankou and returned
this British concession to the Nationalists in February 1927.94 Meanwhile, the
strengthening of the Kuomintang regime was also evidenced in the Nanjing incident
南京事件 happened in March 1927. Whilst entering the city of Nanjing, some
soldiers of the Northern expeditionary force 國民革命軍 participated in looting
activities, resulting in some causalities of western subjects.95 However, it was
infeasible, if not impossible, for the imperial powers to solve this dispute by force
similar to what they did in the case of the Boxer Uprising twenty-seven years earlier.
Eventually, foreign powers including Britain did not impose any sanctions on China
in order not to further stir up Chinese hostilities on westerners.96 Financial
compensation made by the Kuomintang government to the foreign powers was a
symbol showing the Republic of China earned recognitions from countries overseas.
Undoubtedly, the advance of the Nationalist government in Shanghai also
pressured the British authorities. With a view to exerting its dominant influence in
Shanghai, the Nationalist government not only set up yellow unions among the
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labour classes,97 but it also politically emasculated Chinese capitalists in Shanghai.98
Furthermore, Chinese representatives in the Municipal Council were also closely
connected with the Kuomintang authorities.99 Concerning the issue of the
extraterritoriality, the Chinese government attempted to abolish the unequal treaties
signed between the Qing government and the foreign powers.100 Jiang Jieshi even
promised Chinese merchants in 1927 that he would restore foreign concessions in
three years.101 The control over the Settlement Court in Shanghai, which symbolised
the national sovereignty, was anxiously wanted by the Nationalist government.102
More importantly, the use of military force was no longer applicable in
suppressing disturbances in China since the late 1920s. Unifying China successfully
by a well-trained armed force, Jiang Jieshi emphasised that the new-established
Nationalists government would not be frightened by any kinds of violence.
If foreign powers continued to point their guns towards China, such
action will fail to protect lives and property of western settlers and it will also be
harmful on foreign interests. China nowadays is utterly different with herself in
the 19th century. The National Revolutionary Army 國民革命軍 will not only
protect foreign subjects, but they will not be afraid of any violence and
demonstrations. Therefore, it is unnecessary for other countries to dispatch their
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troops in China.103
Not only were Chinese armies been strengthened by 1927, but western powers also
lacked a consensus in providing additional military reinforcements in defending
Shanghai because of various reasons.104 Meanwhile, after experiencing the
nightmare of the First World War in the mid-1910s, the British public was weary of
wars in general. Therefore, neither external nor internal factors favoured Britain to
engage in any war theatres.105 Knowing the impossibility to protect British interests
in China, the Service Ministries in Britain even informed the Secretary for foreign
Affairs Austen Chamberlain that “…the forces required for defence may be larger
than we had supposed… what we have either available or capable of being readily
made available is not more than enough for Shanghai and Tianjin.”106 As a result, in
spite of the fact that Britain eventually dispatched troops to Shanghai in early 1927,
Austen Chamberlain and the British Ambassador to China Miles Lampson
understood that they could not alleviate anti-British sentiments solely relying on
military presence. It was because the Shanghai International Settlement and other
British concessions in China were indeed indefensible.
Furthermore, the spread of communism in the Far East also aroused anxiety of the
British government whose economic interests were deeply rooted in China. The
British authorities believed that Russia “never ceased their efforts to destroy
103
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organised society in all civilised countries, first of all and most of all in the British
Empire itself.”107 Antony best even argues that the existence of the Comintern
temporarily diverted Britain’s attention from her concern on the Japanese
aggression.108 Whilst showing his opinion to his colleague, the Lord President of the
Council Arthur Balfour even believed that the Soviets would not only intervene in
the Chinese politics by expelling other foreign powers, but it would also utilised its
influence in China to stir up insurgencies in the East Indies controlled by Britain and
the Netherlands.109 In addition, British diplomats also worried about the intrusion of
communism in British India and Afghanistan due to their geographical proximity to
China.110 Meanwhile, in his dispatch written to the British Foreign Office in 1930,
the British Consul in Shanghai J.F. Brenan reported that communist outposts near
Yangtse River would create disturbances in industrial and strategic centres located in
Hankou and Shanghai. According to the intelligence, well-trained and armed Red
Partisan detachments were attached to different major cities, waiting for instructions
from Moscow to instigate mass upheavals in China.111 Threatened by communist
activities, the British authorities in China had to check the expansion of communist
activities by all means. As a consequence, Britain was keen to express her sympathy
to the Kuomintang regime which was anti-communist in nature.112 Only by
cooperating with the Kuomintang regime could the British authorities effectively
alleviate anti-foreign sentiments and could repress the spread of communism in Asia.
Indeed, the British informal empire in China was on the brink of expulsion and
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extinction. Nevertheless, surrendering the entire Settlement and the privilege of the
extraterritoriality to the Kuomintang at once was unwise according to Whitehall
policy-makers. The British authorities and even King George V recognised that it
was necessary, if not compulsory, to protect and retain the British sphere of influence
in Shanghai where enormous British commercial interests was located.113 Compared
to Hong Kong and other British treaty ports in China, Shanghai alone contributed
£151.53 million out of £200 million of the total British interests in China in 1929.
British settlers in Shanghai had also obtained approximately 90% of the land owned
by foreigners between 1901 and 1902. The Butterfield & Swire and the Jardine
Matheson were even the two main companies dominating coastal trades in
Shanghai.114 Whilst explaining policies of the British Foreign Office in China to his
colleague Ramsay MacDonald, Chamberlain even stressed that he could not tolerate
the expulsion of the British presence in Shanghai and Canton if negotiation failed.115
Moreover, the British government and commercial firms had positive projections
towards the future of China where massive and vigorous improvements in different
aspects were shown, in terms of the education, the literature, medal supports,
athletics and the commerce.116 Despite the communist intrusion in the Far East, J. F.
Brenan firmly believed that China would get rid of communism. Being proud of their
own cultures and civilisation, the Chinese would not be utterly assimilated by
communism since “the principles of Marx are foreign to the Chinese conception of
things.”117 Firmly believing that China was the largest underdeveloped market in the
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world, the British authorities were encouraged to retain their interests in China where
economic growths were anticipated.118 An increasing demand of foreign goods was
evidenced by looking at revenue figures. Even though China was on the brink of
wars in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, customs authorities received increasing
revenue figures of foreign import returns, rising from 4,120,701 Taels in 1929 to
4,283,344 Taels in 1930.119 The expected prosperity of Shanghai was heavily
emphasised by Brenan in his report to Lampson. With a view to keeping away from
the Sino-Japanese hostility, many wealthy classes would seek for refugee with their
capitals in the International Settlement where protection was secured by foreign
powers.120 Therefore, Brenan believed that once the order was restored, “there
would be a boom in trade as Shanghai had never known in its previous history.”121
Therefore, Britain had to be very cautious in relinquishing her privileges in China.
While illustrating his opinion towards the prospect of China in his report, K. Lung,
staff of the Perrin’s Limited in Shanghai, urged the British government to treasure
opportunities to trade with China which was considered by him as the next world
market.122 Lung even believed that it was worthwhile for Britain to declare war on
Japan for the sake of protecting British interests in China and other parts of the
British Empire.
I believe that even a war with Japan would be preferable to letting Japan take
all the India markets, squeezing England out in Australia, in South Africa, in
the Dutch Colonies and dominate China!123
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As a result, given that Shanghai was of paramount importance to Britain, the British
Foreign Office would therefore asked the Shanghai Municipal Council to provide
more concessions to the Chinese and to develop municipal administrations in
response to growing demands of the Chinese society in Shanghai.124
Apart from having tremendous interests and positive projections in Shanghai, the
British government was also afraid of the nature of the Chinese legal system. British
settlers never believed that the Republic of China shared similar liberal values and
autonomous judicial frameworks with the western world. Not only were they dubious
on the neutrality and the objectivity of the Chinese legal system, but they also had no
confidence on the autocratic rule of the Kuomintang based on the Continental
European model. In spite of the Chinese government’s endeavour to modernise law
codes, the judicial system in republican China still failed to provide independent and
impartial judgements to British settlers who believed in the Anglo-Saxon legal
tradition.125 A manager of an engineering firm also opposed dispensing with the
extraterritoriality as the abolition of German extraterritoriality in China during World
War One was an alert to the British. He also argued the Chinese courts would first
protect Chinese interests provided that there were disputes between Chinese buyers
and British firms.126 Apart from judicial frameworks, British settlers also had no
confidence on the type of municipal government practiced by the Chinese authorities.
Imitating the Continental European model, the Chinese Municipality in Shanghai
was far from independent and democratic compared to the Anglo-Saxon model
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which comprised an elected council with legislative and financial controls only.127
Knowing about difficulties in implementing the Anglo-Saxon model in China,
Lampson believed that the success of the Chinese political transformation not only
required foreign leadership and control, but it would also take years to accomplish.128
It was impossible for Britain to accept the repudiation of extraterritoriality at once.
Therefore, British diplomats and merchants insisted on the transfer of political power
to China gradually depending on China’s reform progress.
As pointed out by Lampson and Chamberlain, peace and amity, which were the
primary concerns of British merchants, were prerequisites for trade in China.129
Therefore, two main principles adopted by the British government in the late 1920s
were to support a Chinese run-government in Shanghai with foreign involvements
and to transfer power to the Chinese gradually. It was anticipated by Lampson that a
municipality of Greater Shanghai would be entitled to govern the International
Settlement, the French Concession, the harbour and the Chinese districts “under a
Chinese municipal administration with some form of adequate foreign participation
in municipal affairs so far as they concern foreign interest.”130 Furthermore,
Lampson also reassured the need for the gradual sinification of the municipal council
and other governmental bodies. At the same time the Chinese were educated in
western theories and practices of a municipal government which would not be
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harmful to foreign interests.131 Subsequently, Miles Lampson concluded that his task
in China was to strive for a balance between protecting British vested interests and
the satisfaction of legitimate Chinese national aspiration. Yet Lampson also
emphasised that the hysterical Chinese could not get all concessions at once. Thus,
only by transferring power gradually could secure the safety of British economic
interests in China.132 With a view to facilitating Lampson’s negotiation with the
Chinese authorities, Chamberlain was also pushing hard to seek for the support from
the British parliament at home.133
Therefore, the British government employed the strategy with both “reason and
force” in Shanghai for the sake of saving the empire in the face of the fervid Chinese
nationalism.134 The scenario in Shanghai in the mid-1920s echoed the condition in
southern China. As Edmund Fung argues in his book The Diplomacy of Imperial
Retreat, Whitehall politicians adopted the policy of “combining conciliation with
firmness”, alleviating the Chinese nationalism while protecting British life and
properties at the same time.135 Even before the Kuomintang rose to power, Britain
began to readjust its foreign policies in China in the mid-1920s. Whilst stationing
adequate amount of troops to some treaty ports for self-defence, the British
diplomatic authorities in China initiated negotiations with regional Chinese
authorities about the issue of the treaty revision.136 More concessions were even
made by the British government after the Kuomintang’s completion of the northern
expedition in 1928. With the exception of the extraterritoriality, the British Foreign
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Office was willing to surrender an array of economic and diplomatic privileges to the
Kuomintang government, relinquishing tariff and taxation, the customs
administration, the service of China’s debt and leased territories.137 Therefore, the
reforms that the Shanghai Municipal Council carried out were in line with
readjustments of British diplomatic policies in different part of China during the
mid-1920s.
As a result, forcible measures were employed only to protect British interests in
case of any emergencies and disturbances in Shanghai. Composed of approximately
16,000 servicemen from Britain and India, the Shanghai Defence Force was
dispatched to Shanghai for a self-defence purpose.138 Lampson never intended to see
many British soldiers “kicking their heels in Shanghai” unless their presence was
really necessary.139 Chamberlain was even anxious and dubious that the British
Consul in Shanghai Sidney Barton would instruct British soldiers to suppress
Chinese demonstrations which were not a policy of His Majesty’s Government.140 In
the worst scenario, the British government prepared for evacuating all British
inhabitants and properties in China, including Lampson himself.141 When conditions
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became more stable and negotiations were effective in China, the Cabinet began to
pressure Chamberlain to reduce the number of troops in August 1927.142 Later,
Chamberlain eventually agreed with the Secretary of State for War Laming
Worthington-Evans that it was unnecessary for the British military authorities to keep
a massive number of soldiers in China in 1929.143 Obviously, British military
presence in Shanghai in the late 1920s was mainly defensive in nature and was
different from British troops employed to invade Beijing during the Boxer uprising
in 1900.
Conversely, Lampson and Chamberlain agreed to start liberal and peaceful
negotiations with the Chinese authorities with regard to the issue of the treaty
revision. Before the Kuomintang controlled the entire country effectively,
Chamberlain had authorised Lampson to initiate negotiations with the Nationalist
regime concerning the future of Shanghai in 1927.144 Recognising foreign privileges
in China as a kind of political servitude, Lampson agreed that the extraterritoriality
and all other treaty questions should be abolished gradually.145 Regarding the
retention of Shanghai as a commercial centre, Frederick Whyte advocated to secure a
stable socio-political environment for British economic interests at the expense of
sacrificing some political power. He held a view that the British authorities in
Shanghai should prepare other opportunities for greater Chinese involvements in the
municipal administrations in the future.146 In fact, Lampson understood that an array
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of political and judiciary issues originating from the extraterritoriality might further
agitate the Sino-British hostility in Shanghai.147 Though the British authorities were
ready to relinquish some of their privileges, it didn’t mean a total submission to the
Chinese. Provided that the safety of British interests was guaranteed, the British
government was willing to reach different agreements with the Chinese authorities
about the gradual abolishment of certain degree of foreign rights in Shanghai.148
Unquestionably, the British only gave up relatively insignificant privileges at the
very beginning. The more stable and reformed China was, the more concessions the
British would made.149 As a result, the British Foreign office pressured the Shanghai
Municipal Council to meet Chinese demands by carrying out internal reforms in the
Settlement. In the following section, I will examine significances of the
reconstruction of the judicial institutions in Shanghai which would favour the
Shanghai Municipal Police and the Kuomintang authorities to arrest and extradite the
communists in the future.
Legal reforms of the International Mixed Court
Confronted with unfavourable circumstances which seriously disturbed trades
and investments in China, the British Foreign Office planned to alleviate the
Sino-British hostility by gradually transferring power back to the Chinese.
Apparently, British officials believed that the Sino-British relations and foreign
interests in China could only be secured by introducing gradual reforms and changes
in the Settlement. Politically, the British Foreign Office pressured the Shanghai
Municipal Council to include more Chinese members in municipal managements in
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the mid-1920s as mentioned by Robert Bickers.150 British merchants echoed the
British government’s decision by showing their supports to the Chinese in the
Ratepayer Annual Meeting.151 Thus, the Settlement authorities first reached a
consensus with the Chinese in 1926 to allow three Chinese councillors to join the
council.152 Five years later, the Shanghai Municipal Council even agreed to add two
more places for the Chinese in the council, making five Chinese councillors in
total.153 Undoubtedly, appointing pro-Kuomintang Chinese members in the council
was the first step for the Nationalist government to penetrate its influence into the
Settlement in the following decade.
Yet, compared to political reforms, judicial reconstructions was of utmost
importance leading to the incarceration, the extradition and the reformation of
communists. With regard to legal frameworks in the International Settlement, both
the British and the Chinese authorities had undergone an endless process in
discussing the shift of judicial power by the mid-1920s. In fact, before the
Kuomintang regime rose to power in 1927, the Shanghai Municipal Council and the
British diplomatic authorities negotiated with Sun Chuanfang 孫傳芳’s warlord
government about the repudiation of the extraterritoriality. This was a consequence
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of the fervid Chinese nationalism caused by the May Thirtieth incident in 1925.154
The International Mixed Court 會審公廨, which was dominated by westerners since
its establishment in 1869, was renamed as the Shanghai Provisional Court 上海臨時
法院 after the Rendition Agreement became effective in 1927, attaining a foremost
step in returning part of legal authorities to China. With the exception of cases which
involved the right of consular jurisdiction, all civil and criminal cases in the
International Settlement would be tried in the Provisional Court and its successive
institution.155 After the expiry of the first agreement in 1930, the Nationalist
government and other western diplomatic bodies reached a consensus to renew the
agreement. Not only was the Provisional Court reshuffled into the Shanghai No.1
Special District Court 上海第一特區地方法院, but the Jiangsu High Court No.2
branch 江蘇高等法院第二分院 was also established inside the Settlement in 1930
to deal with appeal cases. Aide from the International Settlement, the French
concession also reached an agreement with China with regard to the transfer of
judicial power at the same time. The Shanghai No.2 Special District Court 上海第二
特區地方法院 and the Jiangsu High Court No.3 branch 江蘇高等法院第三分院
were founded to deal with first trials and appeal cases respectively. From then on,
judicial systems of two foreign concessions almost run in line with that of China by
1930s.156
During the transformation of Settlement’s legal frameworks in the 1920 and the
1930 decade, the Nationalist government exerted its profound influence in judicial
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institutions of the International Settlement. Thanks to Yao Yuan’s effort, we can
understand the increasing dominance of the Kuomintang regime in the settlement
court through studying the evolution of the International Mixed Court.157 In the
following paragraph, I examine how thee reorganisation of the settlement court fit
into the context of the arrest of communists.
Concerning the application of legal systems, Chinese law codes and procedures of
gradually replaced those of the former Mixed Court. Firmly believing that
implementing Chinese legal regulations in foreign concessions was indisputable,
Lampson even thought that applying Chinese laws in British courts in China would
be an excellent way to initiate the revision of the unequal treaties.158 Although the
Shanghai Provisional Court began to enforce Chinese legal law codes drafted by Sun
Chuanfang’s warlord government in the Settlement, established rules of procedures
of the former Mixed Court 會審公廨訴訟慣例 and terms of the rendition
agreement were also taken into consideration.159 By the 1930s, the Shanghai No.1
Special District Court only executed the civil and criminal codes of the Republic of
China 中華民國民法、中華民國刑法 and their associated legal procedures 中華民
國民事訴訟法、中華民國刑事訴訟法 in accordance with the agreement made
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between the British and the Chinese authorities.160 Besides, jails inside the
Settlement had to run in line with Chinese prison regulations. The Shanghai Special
District Court had an authority to decide whether convicts in the Settlement should
be incarcerated in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol or other Chinese prisons outside
foreign concessions.161 The following chapters in this thesis show that the
Nationalist regime fully availed itself of the Chinese criminal codes and procedures
to arrest, to extradite and even to convert communist members living in the
International Settlement.
Moreover, the Kuomintang authorities had absolute controls over appointments of
important personnel of the Settlement Court. Taking advantage of the internal turmoil
in China during the 1911 Revolution, consular bodies took over the management of
the International Mixed Court and privately assigned approved Chinese candidates as
magistrates.162 Nevertheless, the practice of appointing judicial personnel underwent
tremendous change after the May Thirtieth incident. According to the rendition
agreement signed in 1926, the Chinese government reserved a right to appoint a
president 庭長 and judges 推事 of the Provisional Court, as well as judges of the
Court of Appeal 上訴庭推事.163 After 1930, the renewed agreement even
empowered the Chinese authorities to designate their candidates for the position of a
160
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registrar 書記官長 which was in charge of financial and administrative works of the
court.164 As a result, trials and the administrations of the Settlement court were
under heavy surveillance of the Chinese government. Appointed by the Nationalist
regime, magistrates in the Settlement were subject to the influence of the
Kuomintang authorities. No wonder why many western settlers never believed
Chinese judicial system was competent to provide independent and unbiased
judgements.165 As shown in later sections, the political inclination of the court was
particularly obvious when communists were tried by pro-Kuomintang magistrates.
Most importantly, the practice of consular representatives sitting jointly in the
court 會審 and watching proceedings 觀審 were completely terminated by 1930.
The existence of consular personnel in the court could be traced back to the time
when the International Mixed Court was established in 1869. [Please refer to
appendix 5] Provided that cases were consisted of disputes between westerners and
Chinese, consular bodies would send their representatives to try Chinese magistrates
appointed by the Qing government. Owing to the discontinuance of the Qing
Dynasty after 1911, consular deputies even interfered in cases concerning purely
Chinese interests.166 In spite of the fact that the rendition agreement in 1926 limited
consular personnel’s involvement in different cases in specific circumstances,167
164
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consular deputies still exerted enormous influence in decisions made by the court in
many important and controversial cases.168 With a view to expressing their
disagreements with judges appointed by the Chinese government, consular officials
and their deputies could even record his objections.169 The authority of the president
and magistrates were therefore severely undermined by the presence of consular
personnel. Eventually, the repudiation of consular officials’ presence in the court
allowed Chinese magistrates to be exempt from foreign interference.170 Thus, the
Kuomintang successfully overcame this hurdle in order to implement its instructions
in the International Settlement.
In accordance with Lampson’s idea, the adequate retention of western influence
was still necessary for the sake of protecting foreign interests in the Settlement.
Although the Chinese government recovered most of its legal power in the settlement
court, the issue concerning the execution of court orders still revealed the remaining
western dominance in the settlement judiciary. Indeed, it was true that procurators
檢察官 employed by the Chinese government were authorised to carry out
prosecution procedures by virtue of articles from 103 to 186 of the Chinese Criminal
Code after 1930. Nevertheless, the prosecution power of Chinese procurators was
inapplicable to cases which were processed by the Shanghai Municipal Police or
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168
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were within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Court.171 Therefore, the preservation
of municipal police’s prosecution power could possibly safeguard interests of foreign
settlers in the Settlement. Yet, the municipal police were almost cooperative with the
Chinese authorities in dealing with arrests and the extradition of communists in the
International Settlement.
It was of paramount importance that the reorganisations of the Settlement judiciary
since the mid-1920s had significant impact on arrests of communists coordinated by
the Chinese and the Settlement authorities. The neutrality and the impartiality of the
court in the Settlement were infringed in consequence of the Kuomintang’s
interference. The implementation of Chinese law codes and procedures in the
Settlement allowed the Chinese authorities to handle communist suspects in
accordance with inhumane regulations and the political indoctrination. Not only did
the Chinese criminal code 中華民國刑法 authorise enforcement officers to arrest
any suspects involved in any kinds of activities against the internal security of the
republic 危害民國, but the regulation governing the reformatories 反省院條例
also forced non-repentant political offenders to relocate from the Settlement jail to
the Chinese reformatories. Next, China’s appointments of judicial personnel also
obstructed the judicial independence of the settlement court. Whilst dealing with
political cases, Chinese magistrates favoured the Chinese government by extraditing
communists found in the Settlement to the Kuomintang authorities. Blamed for his
failure to secure the successful extradition in a communist case, a president of the
court was even dismissed by Jiang Jieshi.172 Last but not least, the cancellation of
171
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consular personnel’s involvement in judicial cases allowed Chinese influence to
penetrate fluently into the settlement court. The following chapters show hardly
could the municipal police refuse to carry on court orders except for cases consisted
of foreign interests. Thus, the above political and judicial reforms made by the
Settlement authorities formed the backdrop for arresting communists.
In the nutshell, the situation of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the British
Foreign office in the 1920s could fit into the context stated by John Darwin in his
book The Empire Project. London had to readjust its diplomatic policies based on
local circumstances. Before the 1920s, the British government had no interest to
intervene in the politics of the International Settlement and granted autonomy to
British subjects in China. When the Chinese nationalism became more fervid, the
British government began to seize back the power from British communities because
the existence of its informal empire in China was in danger.
Eventually, no wonder British economic interests in China survived at the expense
of the political and judicial power of the Settlement. British settlers, including the
council staff and the municipal police were forced to accept such reality. The
appointments of new Chinese councillors who had close connections with the
Kuomintang first weakened western influence inside the council. More importantly,
the implementation of Chinese legal codes and prison regulations in the International
Settlement not only prevented the Shanghai Municipal Council from protecting its
own Chinese residents in arrests and the extradition procedure, but it also forced the
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municipal gaol to transfer its political offenders to a Chinese reformatory in Soochow.
Worse still, the Kuomintang regime even pressured the Settlement authorities to
provide convenience for arresting and extraditing communist convicts by violating
formal legal procedures. The following three chapters reveal how British expatriates
became faithful allies in eliminating communists not only because of their
anti-Bolshevik beliefs, but also because of their fear about the strengthening of the
Kuomintang government supported by the extreme Chinese nationalism.

52

CHAPTER 3
ARREST
“‘In case of bookshop selling anti-government books, no charge should be preferred against the shop
proprietor or manager unless the Police can prove that the accused knowingly and intentionally
propagates doctrines contrary to People’s Three Principles. Failure to examine books by the
proprietor or manager before the same is offered for sale is not sufficient to constitute an offence.’ In
executing warrants issued by the Shanghai Special District Court at the instance of the Chinese
authorities, it will not be necessary to observe the terms of the above advice.”173

T.P. Givens, Officer i/c Special Branch, Shanghai Municipal Police

The first episode that illustrated readjustments of British imperial policies in
Shanghai was arrests of communists. Before going into details of arrests, we have to
understand the context of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in the
face of communist intrusion. In what ways did the idea of Britishness affect the
perception of the Settlement authorities on communists? Racially, Gary B. Magee
and Andrew S. Thompson regarded British settlers overseas as the kith and kin of the
British in the United Kingdom. The broad sense of “Britishness” facilitated the
construction of social networks as it provided a sense of pan-imperial and cultural
unity among British migrants in different colonies.174 The principle of
“Ethnic-British Sameness” raised by Stuart Ward also suggests that white settler
community residing or working in the empire shared same ties of blood and
culture.175 Thence that British expatriates in Shanghai adopted similar attitude with
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their kith and kin at home towards communists was reasonable. In spite of the fact
that spreading communist ideas was largely tolerated in the metropole, communism
was never prevalent in British societies. Andrew Thorpe explains reasons for the
unpopularity of communism in Britain during the inter-war years in his book. Not
only did communists scare capitalists by advocating the idea of ‘social democracy’,
but Britain also recovered fairly from the First World War compared with other
belligerent states.176 Interests of workers and trade unions were also represented by
the British Labour Party which was the forerunner of labour movements.
Subsequently, the British Communist Party never won supports from the British
public. As an ally of communists who shared some similar social values, the Labour
Party even alienated communists in the election in the 1920s.177 Throughout the
inter-war period, there were only three Members of Parliament from the British
Communist Party since its establishment in 1920.
Moreover, the internal development of communism in Britain threatened survival
of British interests in the world. John Callaghan and Ben Harker describe many
communist activities inside and outside Britain in their co-edited book.178 In fact,
many British communists even provided assistance for colonial subjects exploited by
westerners throughout the British Empire.179 As one of historians studying
communism in Britain, East Wind’s author Buchanan argues that China itself was a
fascination in the views of British leftists although backwardness was the prevailing
245
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perception on China in the 1920s.180 Thus, such idea aroused sympathy among
leftists in the western world and motivated many communists to help China in the
20th century. Undeniably, British communists tried their best to pressure the British
government to adopt lenient policies towards China. In the 1920s, with a view to
preventing invasion from taking place in China, the “Hands off China” movement
successfully forced the government to put the Shanghai Defence Force in a purely
defensive role for protecting British nationals in China. It was not until the 1960s that
British leftists withdrew their supports. It was because they finally understood that
the People’s Republic of China was an autocratic regime as shown in different
political movements.181 Recently released KV2 series files in the National Archive
disclose how British intelligence departments such as the MI5 spared no effort to
keep many European communist notables under heavy surveillance in response to the
amalgamation between communism and nationalism in British colonies overseas.182
Therefore, Britain closely monitored movements of many notable communists,
providing the intelligence to police and the intelligence authorities throughout the
British Empire.
Furthermore, the nature of colonial police forces in the British Empire also
contributed to arrests of communists. In an imperial context, not only did policemen
pay more attention to the interest of the sovereign state, but political cases were
always connected to criminal levels.183 This was particularly true when British
expatriates were eager to establish their authorities in colonies or sphere of influence
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at the beginning of colonisation.184 Georgina Sinclair argues in her work At the end
of the line that the escalation of the colonial police power revived again during the
post-war decolonisation period. With the intensification of the violence in
independent movements, colonial police forces obtained greater power in developing
intelligence and counter-insurgency units for the sake of the empire’s survival.185
Sinclair even described policing the declining empire as a kind of “dirty war”
compared to “the English style of policing by consent.”186 Georgina mainly focuses
on military and intelligence aspects to justify her argument which shows the
expansion of the colonial police power. However, she places little emphasis on the
relationship between the judicial system and the police power. It was true that the
British informal empire in China was at risk because of the spread of communism.
Antony Best illustrates British intelligence departments were preoccupied by the
expansion of communism in the Far East during the 1920s.187
As part of imperial policing networks, the Shanghai Municipal Police also took a
negative view towards communism. The International Settlement therefore began to
apprehend communists interrupting the social stability in Shanghai since the
mid-1920s. For example, those communists or agitators who stirred up labour strikes
and distributed inflammatory pamphlets to civilians at the Settlement would be taken
to custody, waiting for trials in the Mixed Court.188 Besides, informed by different
foreign consulates, the municipal police had also kept an eye on movements of
184
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different western communist agents in Shanghai.189 Indeed, a sophisticated
intelligence network was built between the municipal police, French concession
police, foreign embassies,190 and even colonial police forces overseas.191 Equipped
with heavy weapons and armoured vehicles, the Reserve Unit, which was described
by Leroy Thompson as the first Special Weapons and Tactics team (SWAT) in the
world, was also founded to suppress mass demonstrations, strikes and disturbances in
the settlement.192 [Please refer to appendix 4] Meanwhile, with the hope to pacify
the fervid Chinese nationalism after the outbreak of the May Thirtieth incident in
1925, the Shanghai International Settlement, foreign consulates and Sun Chuanfang’s
Jiangsu provincial government jointly signed the Mixed Court Agreement in 1926.193
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Subsequently, the implementation of Chinese legal codes and procedures in the
International Settlement established the legitimacy for the Nationalist Government to
request the Settlement for assistance when arresting communists later.194 However, it
is worth noticing to discuss how the mentality and procedures of the Shanghai
Municipal Police varied in apprehending communists after the arrival of the
Nationalists who were extremely anti-communist.
In spite of their endeavours to restore the history of the Shanghai Mixed Court in
the existing literature, scholars have neglected methods and procedures employed by
the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in tackling the issue of arresting
communists in Shanghai. The attitude of the British and the Settlement authorities on
the nationalism and the communism in Shanghai has been attached with greater
weight by different scholars. Robert Bickers argues that British settlers in Shanghai
were forced to compromise with the Chinese in various respects under the pressure
from the British Foreign Office since the late 1920s.195 Nevertheless, focusing
mainly on the localisation of British commercial and religious sectors in China,
Bickers places less emphasis on the transformation of political and legal activities in
foreign concessions between 1927 and 1937”.196 Thus, the execution of police
power of the Shanghai Municipal Police during the rise of Jiang Jieshi remains
unexplored. Leroy Thompson makes a good attempt to study reactions of the
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municipal police in dealing with mass demonstrations under the turmoil attributed to
different political movements. Indeed, police riot squads were deployed to suppress
mass demonstrations and strikes agitated by communists.197 Yet Thompson’s book
merely depicts the municipal police’s strategic planning and utilisation of weapons
on crowd controls. How to curb down the sources of unrest through legal procedures
is still unexamined.198
In addition, the perspective of the Nationalist regime in arrests was also
unexplored. Frederic Wakeman attributes the failure of the modernisation of
bureaucracy and institution in Shanghai to the “lamentable durability of
governmentalised autocracy” under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi.199 Although
Frederic Wakeman illustrated the collaboration between the municipal police, French
police and Chinese intelligence agents in arresting communists, he mainly intends to
use this example to explain the stagnancy of regular police works in Chinese
territories and radical rightist ideologies possessed by Jiang’s officers.200
Nonetheless, criminal procedures employed by the municipal police in handling
communist arrests were not included in his chapter about the reds.
Strategies and tactics employed by the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai
during the 1920s and 1930s are well-noted by S.A. Smith and Patricia Stranahan. The
former focused on the united front period when the Nationalists were still an ally of
communists, whereas the latter studied the decade after the split between the
Kuomintang and the reds in 1927. Smith highlights efforts of communists in
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mobilising the mass to openly revolt against warlords and westerners. The leading
role of the communist party in agitating disturbances in the May Thirtieth incident in
the International Settlement and armed uprisings against warlord are examined by
Smith.201 Yet, what happened after 1927 is utterly omitted by the author.
Conceivably, Stranahan further explores the changing patterns of communist
activities in Shanghai during the Nanjing decade. Driven underground in response to
political suppressions, Shanghai communists began to abandon pure Marxist idea
taught by the Commintern, and ingratiated themselves with other patriotic
organisations to fight against the Kuomintang and imperialists.202 In spite of the fact
that Stranahan reveals the alliance of the Chinese and the Settlement police in
apprehending communists since the early 1930s, she does not explain judicial
mechanisms executed by the municipal police behind the scenes.203
By looking at a legal perspective, Yao Yuan investigates the institution of the
Settlement judicial system and the ambivalence between the Chinese authorities and
legal departments of the Settlement in the Shanghai Special District Court. Citing
arrests of communists as one of her examples, Yao mainly focuses on the extradition
to illustrate the political calculation of the municipal police. The process of the
apprehension and the issue of arrest warrants are not found in her book.204 Most
importantly, Yao’s inability to consult court proceeding documents and special
branch files of the municipal police becomes a major weakness of her book. Studying
the Chinese criminal justice, Klaus Mühlhahn argues that the evolution of legal
regulations in China was based on changing social conditions in the country. During
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wars and revolutions between the 1920s and 1940s, regular legal procedures and
standards in China were replaced by “the politicisation and the brutalisation of the
criminal justice”.205 Nevertheless, Mühlhahn neither discusses whether his argument
is still valid in the context of the Shanghai International Settlement, nor investigates
if the settlement police force was influenced by the autocracy of the Chinese
authorities.
Not only was the foreign presence in Shanghai threatened by the fervid Chinese
nationalism, but it was also endangered by communist assassination incidents in the
Settlement during the early 1930s. The argument of this chapter is to reveal
readjustments of British imperial policies in Shanghai throughout the late 1920s and
1930s by making legal concessions in arresting communists. I also argue that the
Shanghai Municipal Police had to rely on the strengthened Nationalist government to
suppress communist activities for the the International Settlement’s survival. The
loose and simplified criminal procedures were employed by the Shanghai Municipal
Police during arrests of communists. Aside from using formal legal channels, the
Settlement police also utilised illegal channels to cope with the Nationalists in
apprehensions. In addition to their failure to execute warrants accordingly, the
municipal police even arrested some communist suspects without acquiring formal
approvals from the Shanghai Special District Court. The violation of criminal
procedures signified the diminishing authority of the municipal police in the judicial
system of the Settlement and paved the way for further concessions shown in
chapters about the extradition and the reformatories. Yet, the municipal advocate and
some of senior police officers still attempted to maintain the judicial independence of
the International Settlement by reasserting the need to carry out any actions in the
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light of the legal procedure. This chapter also analyses the ambivalence between the
front-line police constables and the council staff about the issue of arresting
communists. The infringement of the legal autonomy in foreign concession was
eventually inevitable when the law and order of the Settlement was threatened by the
communist intrusion.
Complex legal procedures
Since the northern expedition was almost completed in April 1927, the Shanghai
Municipal Council recognised the legitimacy of the Kuomintang in ruling over
China.206 Frightened by an immediate communist invasion after General Sun
Chuanfang in Shanghai was defeated in March 1927, the chairman of the municipal
council Stirling Fessenden decided to cooperate with the Kuomintang to suppress
communist activities in Shanghai. He allowed the Shanghai Green Gang, which was
affiliated with the Kuomintang, to pass through the International Settlement and
eventually to purge all communist bodies in Zhabei 閘北 according to instructions
given by the Kuomintang.207 According to Stranahan, the Settlement authorities
even provided the Kuomintang with the intelligence to shut down communist bodies
in Chinese territories.208 This incident was later known as the “Shanghai massacre of
1927”上海清黨.
From the above paragraph, it seems that the settlement authorities facilitated
suppressions of communist activities in Chinese territory when Jiang Jieshi first
came to power in 1927. However, the attitude of the municipal police was utterly
opposite when the Chinese government requested the Settlement to provide more
assistance to apprehend communists in the Settlement. Meanwhile, in spite of the
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promulgation of modern Chinese criminal codes and procedures in Shanghai in 1928,
the Chinese authorities did not enforce them strictly. 209 Therefore, it was not
surprising that there were different expectations for the Chinese and Settlement
authorities in arresting political criminals living in the International Settlement. It
was undoubted that complex legal procedures of the Settlement would intensify the
confrontations between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities during arrests of
communists.
The first legal controversy was the acquisition of arrest warrants from the court in
the Settlement. Although the Chinese intelligence and police agents had been
allowed to take part in arrests since the mid-1920s, they still had to acquire warrants
issued by judicial authorities before reporting to police stations in the Settlement.
Before the arrival of the Nationalists, warrants had become a significant part of
legal frameworks in apprehensions. According to “the Rules of procedure 1914 and
1919 of the International Mixed Court in Shanghai”, the municipal police were the
prosecution authority and were entitled to apply to the court for a warrant of arrest
against people violating decrees.210 During an arrest, police officers were even
requested to show a warrant to an accused.211 Arrests without warrants could only be
accepted by the court if cases involved flagrant delictors 現行犯 who were
“pursued by cries of any person”, or “possessed dangerous weapons and important
properties.”212 Likewise, the Chinese criminal procedures promulgated in 1928 also
stated that an arrest should be made with a warrant against an accused who was
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“strongly suspected of having committed an offence”.213 A warrant must also be
presented to an accused during an arrest.214 However, a flagrante delictor who
owned destructive weapons or stolen property, or was committing a crime at the
scene, could be legally arrested by policemen without any warrants. 215 Indeed,
before the 1930s, it was true that the municipal police sometimes apprehended
communists without warrants provided that flagrant delictors were involved in
crimes. Loo Yih Noong 羅亦農, a communist leader agitating many strikes in the
Settlement, was arrested by the municipal police merely based on a report of a
female called Shih Hwa in April 1928.216 Communists conducting meeting in the
Settlement were also apprehended by policemen without presenting any warrants. 217
On 9th August 1927, representatives of the Nationalist Military Headquarter and the
municipal police raided 910A East Yuhang Road which was the residence of an
armed communist. The wanted man was missing but plenty of pistols, ammunition
and hatchets were seized in his room. Nine men found on the premise were arrested
pending on a warrant for their extradition.218
213
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Therefore, theoretically, in most of criminal cases, the Settlement and the Chinese
police authorities should obtain warrants issued by the court before apprehending
anyone. This arrangement should also be applicable to communist suspects who were
sued for “against the internal security of the state” 內亂罪219 unless they were
classified as flagrant delictors. However, since the promulgation of the law, the
Chinese authorities did not enforce their criminal procedures accordingly when
handling political offenders. After the strengthening of the Kuomintang, many
communists were often arrested, imprisoned and even executed by the Chinese
military authorities without undergoing any regular legal processes in any formal
legal institutions. Arrested by members of “the Committee to Eradicate Communists”
in Shanghai, a young female communist was taken to a military headquarter for trial.
She was eventually executed by the order of General Yang Hu.220 The lack of formal
legal procedures in the context of handling communist cases coincides with
Mühlhahn’s argument. It was because formal legal structures in China were replaced
by “politicisation and brutalisation of criminal justice” during wars and
revolutions.221
Aside from the judicial differentiation, the antagonism between the Settlement and
the Chinese authorities was also attributed to the nature of different police models. Dr.
Von Kiebtner, who was an ex-adviser employed by Jiang Jieshi to train Chinese
police officers, was interviewed by the Municipal Police in December 1929.
He analysed disparities between the municipal police and the Chinese police
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authorities when apprehending criminals. According to his observation and
experience, Dr. Kiebtner believed that it was necessary for Settlement policemen to
obtain sufficient evidence and authority before arresting anyone. He explained his
idea to the municipal police by comparing different police systems in various
countries.

…the police system in the French Concession and the Settlement are
contrary to police systems in China and in Germany, from which latter
country China has copied, any of her police methods, in so far that the
Police of the French Concession and the Settlement have no power to
punish, whereas the police in Chinese controlled territory have power to
arrest and detain a man indefinitely on mere suspicion, irrespective of
whether a complaint has been made in a charge laid against the prisoner.222
Dr. Von Kiebtner further illustrated that the Chinese authorities even regarded the
detention methods employed by Settlement policemen in Shanghai as “a
manifestation of weakness.”223 Indeed, the British judicial system actually did not
favour arrest without warrants in the 1930s, provided that an accused was not a
flagrant delictor. Ho Chi Minh 胡志明, one of the founders of the Vietnam
Communist Party, was apprehended by the Hong Kong Police Force in 1930. In
accordance with the decision made by the Privy Council in London, the detention of
Ho was illegal due to the absence of a warrant. Eventually, Ho was acquitted of the
charge against him. Ho was even allowed to travel outside Hong Kong.224 Despite
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the fact that the Hong Kong Police shared similar political interests with the Chinese
authorities and the Shanghai Municipal Police, the British judicial system, which was
free from political control, still emphasised on the importance of fair trials for
everyone regardless of their political affiliations.
As a result, the International Settlement could hardly show any “sympathy” to the
Chinese authorities when the Kuomintang came to power. It was necessary for
Chinese agents to apply for warrants from the Provisional Court before apprehending
communists in the Settlement. Such principle of arrest was confirmed after the
municipal police officers at the Hongkew Station assisted the Chinese authorities to
arrest Tsho Meu Teong in 1124 San Siu Li, Broadway on 5th July, 1927, by virtue of a
warrant issued by General Pai Chung Hai. Tsho Meu Teong not only failed to match
the person stated in the warrant, but his books found at the premise also contained
nothing about communism. Therefore, the Commissioner of Police Edward Barrett
recommended to the municipal council that “in future dispatch warrants of this
description (issued from the Chinese authority) be dealt with only after reference to
the Provisional Court from whom a warrant must be obtained setting forth the name
and charge against the accused.”225 Thus, the municipal police would promise the
Chinese authorities to initiate any arrest only after the Chinese had applied for
warrants from the Provisional Court at the Settlement. On 16th July, 1927, the
Dalbank in 29 Szechuen Road was raided and sealed by Settlement policemen who
received a dispatch warrant endorsed by the Provisional Court warrant from the
Chinese authorities.” The warrant indicated that this bank was assisting
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225
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communists.226 Even requests of banning the reactionary literature in the Settlement
must be first sent to the Provisional Court.227 Subsequently, orders would be issued
from the court to the municipal police in order to make prohibitions become
effective.228 On the other hand, apprehension requisitions would be rejected if the
Chinese failed to present warrants issued by the Settlement Court. On 7th September,
1927, the Nationalist East Front Military Headquarter requested assistance from the
settlement to arrest a communist suspect called Chou Pao-yuen. As they did not
obtain a warrant from the Provisional Court and failed to show any descriptions, their
requisition was eventually rejected.229
In addition, the municipal police would only abide by details stated in warrants.
Indeed, the Chinese Criminal Procedures stated that before an apprehension began, a
warrant should be issued specifying clearly about the information of the accused
such as his / her full name, sex, residence, facts of the case and reasons for an
arrest.230 [Please refer to appendix 7] According to the Kuomintang intelligence
chief Xu Enceng 徐恩曾, Settlement policemen would refuse to cooperate with his
men provided that details of the accused was inaccurate.231 Before requesting for
assistance, Chinese agents had to state clearly in a warrant about the personal
226
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particulars of an accused such as his / her age, appearance, address and even room
number. Even though an accused immediately jumped to another flat next to the
reported location, the municipal police would not continue their search. This strict
and inflexible practice was still in used occasionally in the 1930s when the
relationship between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities was improved.232
While reporting to General Jiang Jieshi, the chief of the Public Safety Bureau Wang
Zhenxing 黃振興 admitted that although the municipal police were willing to
provide assistance to arrest communists living in the Settlement, formalities and
procedures for these arrests were still onerous.233
Subsequently, Chinese intelligence departments were less efficient in carrying out
their arrests due to judicial barriers set by the Settlement. This eventually intensified
the hostility between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities. As a consequence,
complex legal procedures led to illegal arrests of Chinese military and intelligence
officers. On 10th August, 1927, a few nationalist soldiers attempted to take a
communist suspect called Hung Tai-nyeu into custody without noticing Settlement
policemen. The Senior Consul’s Deputy not only protested for the extradition
decision, but he also criticised these Chinese soldiers for kidnapping Hung. It was
because the arrest was conducted without a proper warrant.234 Again, on 24th
October, 1927, six Chinese detectives arrested three alleged communists near the
North Szechuen Road and took them to Military Headquarter without noticing the
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municipal police.235 Apart from apprehending Chinese suspects, the Nationalist
government even illegally arrested British subjects such as Hong Kong Chinese and
British Indians in the International Settlement without informing the municipal
police. The Chinese government did not release these innocent people until the
British embassy interfered in these cases.236
Likewise, never did the Kuomintang cooperate with the municipal police when
arresting Indian seditionists who advocated the independence of British India.237
Since the Chinese authorities refused to provide assistance to arrestiIndian
nationalists, the municipal police illegally apprehended Indian suspects in Chinese
controlled territory without informing Chinese policemen.238 This illegal arrest even
aroused strong discontent and criticisms among Indian communities in Shanghai on
the Chinese government in 1930.239
In short, the Shanghai Municipal Police’s desire to maintain the judicial autonomy
of the International Settlement caused inefficiency for arresting communists wanted
by the Chinese government. The antagonism between the International Settlement
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and the Nationalist government would continue until the early 1930s when the
Shanghai Municipal Police gradually realised that the safety of the Settlement was
seriously threatened by communist assassination cases in Shanghai.

Security crises and the Red Brigade
The early 1930s were a watershed that illustrates how the policy of the
International Settlement was changed when arresting communists. In accordance
with Stranahan, the shifting attitude of the municipal police could partly be explained
by the increasing communist propagation on foreign troops in the 1930s.240 Some
police constables of the municipal police even engaged in communist activities.241
Besides, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the new united front policy
employed by communists to ally with patriotic organisations in Shanghai further
worsened the turmoil.242 It seems that purifying law enforcement officers and
eliminating the source of contamination became more important for the Shanghai
Municipal Police.
Nevertheless, I suggest that the survival of the Settlement and the imperial
presence strengthened the determination of the municipal police to remove
communists. Confronted with a mixture of the nationalism and the communism in
China, British expatriates could no longer maintain their existence by themselves
alone. The inability of the municipal police to deal with communist assassination
incidents in the Settlement inevitably forced itself to cooperate with the Chinese
authorities wholeheartedly when apprehending communists. Indeed, such view is
240
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recognised by Fredrick Wakeman who stresses that the Settlement was more willing
to provide its “entire help and collaboration in the campaign against the Chinese
Communist Party” because of British settlers’ intention to check communist advance
in the city.243 As a result, the deadlock between the Settlement and the Chinese
authorities to arrest communists was solved in the early 1930s because the internal
security of the Settlement was severely threatened by communist murder cases.
Indeed, Nationalist agents and traitors of the communist party were the targets of
the red brigade. Nevertheless, it was undeniable that punishing communist traitors
and Chinese agents not only led to massacres of their families, but it also
unintentionally brought heavy casualties to civilians living in foreign concessions.
Therefore, foreign concessions became more unstable.
Murder was a common method employed by the red brigade to kill their targets.
Gu Shunzhang 顧順章, who was once the head of the communist red brigade, was
arrested by the Chinese authorities in Hankou in 1931. The Nationalist government
soon made good use of the intelligence provided by Gu to shut down communist
bases throughout the country.244 With a view to taking revenge on behalf of their
comrades, the red brigade interned the Gu’s family living in the International
Settlement soon after Gu’s surrender. Eventually, Zhou Enlai 周恩來, the future
premier of the People’s Republic of China, ordered his subordinates to strangulate
almost all family members and some friends of Gu and buried their corpses
underground.245 Knowing that Gu’s family and friends were assassinated, the
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Chinese intelligence departments contacted the municipal police and French police
for excavating bodies buried in foreign concessions in late November 1931.246
According to the police daily report, at least seven corpses were unearthed at depths
up to about 8 feet at 91-A Sinza Road 新閘路 of the International Settlement within
three days.247 Propagated by media and press in Shanghai and overseas, this
assassination incident not only caused humiliations on the Shanghai Municipal
Council, but they also challenged the ability of Settlement policemen in maintaining
the law and order in the Settlements.248 When visiting Gu Shunzhang and Chinese
intelligence departments in Nanjing after this assassination incident, officers of two
Settlement police forces were informed more about details of communists meetings,
murders and kidnappings in foreign concessions. Feeling shameful and ignorant,
Settlement policemen promised to try their best to cooperate with the Chinese
government to arrest communists in the future.249
The red brigade was also convicted of assaulting people in the public. Taking
revenge for their comrades, red brigade members killed some Chinese intelligence
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agents on the street in the Settlement and Chinese territory in the early 1930s.250
Worse still, civilians and policemen of the Settlement were sometimes killed
accidentally. On 27th September, 1934, two red brigade members openly shot a
communist traitor Xiong Guohua 熊國華 inside a ward of Lester Chinese Hospital
仁濟醫院. During their escapes, red brigade members shot policemen, killing two of
them. One of pedestrians was killed by stray bullets. Totally, this assassination
incident caused six casualties, of which four people were killed and two people were
injured. The Red brigade escaped successfully afterwards.251 Frightened by the
assassination of Xiong, the public and policemen took cover behind any objects on
the street. The atmosphere in foreign concessions became tense. Feeling unable to
solve the problem alone, Settlement policemen urgently asked the Chinese Public
Safety Bureau for assistance to arrest communist fugitives.252
To conclude, increasing number of assassination cases forced the municipal police
to reinforce their cooperation with the Chinese government to suppress communist
activities in Shanghai. The Settlement authorities understood that communist
disturbances occurred in foreign concessions and Chinese territory were inevitably
inter-related with each other. Settlement policemen had to ally with the Nationalist
government to encounter the rising communist threat. In consequence, the municipal
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police were more willing to give their helping hands to the Chinese government to
apprehend communists in the 1930s, even though they had to violate legal
procedures.
A trustworthy partnership
The communist threat helped to strengthen the relationship between foreign
concessions and the Kuomintang government in the early 1930s. The Shanghai
Municipal Police would cooperate with the Chinese authorities to apprehend
communists by all means. Indeed, it was true that many policemen in different
stations were mobilised to spot any possible political offences in their districts. In
April 1931, deputy commissioners Springfield (Divisions) and Aiers (Crime and
Special Branches) requested their detective colleagues in all districts to fully
cooperate with Special Branch officers in cases of any arrests relating to political
offenders. According to instructions, policemen should categorise political offences
as criminal cases. District detectives not only had to take part in arrests, but they
were also asked to prepare crime diaries and other legal documents for trials.253 It
was obvious that more police departments were involved in handling political
offences, extending from the Special Branch to all police stations. Concerning
judicial proceedings of arrests, not only did Settlement policemen employ formal
ways to arrest communists, but they also occasionally violated criminal procedures in
order to make arrests become more effective and efficient. The collaborative
relationship between the Settlement and the Chinese authorities was only forced to
terminate after Japanese invasion in Shanghai in 1937.
By virtue of the Chinese criminal procedures, the municipal police were
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authorised to arrest flagrant delictors without obtaining any warrant. On 22nd
September, 1932, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau provided the intelligence to
the special branch of the municipal police about a communist meeting. Detective
sergeant Moore and his two colleagues from the Special Branch were instructed to
proceed directly to the premise located in Penang Road without asking police
stations nearby for assistance. No legal dispatches were mentioned in the police
report. Even Sergeant Moore himself admitted that “this procedure was adopted in
view of the urgency of the call.”254 Eventually, nine communist suspects at the
meeting were arrested on the scene and escorted to Pootoo Road Police station.255
Meanwhile, the municipal police and Chinese intelligence departments responded
quickly to some assassination cases without applying for warrants from the
Settlement court. After Xiong Guohua and several police and civilians were shot by
the red brigade on 26th September, 1934, a memorandum was immediately signed
between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities concerning the arrest of red
brigade members. The memorandum stated that the Chinese Public Security Bureau
not only would get these communist criminals extradited, but it would also
coordinate all actions in this arrest operation against the red brigade.256 Eventually,
the red brigade leader Kwang Wei-an 鄺惠安 and other ten convicts were arrested.
Plenty of weapons were seized in two foreign concessions.257 Again, the court was
254

Detective Sergeant Moore, “Raid made on premises situated at 32 Chien Shing Faung, Penang
Road, by members of the Special Branch on September, 22, 1932”, in “Copies of crime diaries - cases
arising out of raids or arrests”, ref. D4056, in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files,
1894-1944; Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Intelligence Reports, 1st-30th September, 1932 , ref.:
U1-1-1187, 23rd September, 1932, 226
255
Detective Sergeant Moore, “Raid made on premises situated at 32 Chien Shing Faung, Penang
Road, by members of the Special Branch on September, 22, 1932”, in “Copies of crime diaries - cases
arising out of raids or arrests”
256
Xiaomie Gongfei Hongduian Zhi Jingyanjianshu〈消滅共匪紅隊案之經驗簡述〉The experience
in eliminating the red brigade of the communist party in Youguan Gu Shunzhang Deng Poan Jingguo
《有關顧順章等破案經過》The process for arresting Gu Shunzhang
257
27 pistols, 26 magazines, 2 bombs, 1003 rounds of ammunition, 1 dagger, 1 steel vest and a
quantity of communistic literature were seized. Several of the pistols seized have been identified as
76

uninformed about this arrest until the Chinese authorities applied for the extradition
of offenders.258 The law and order were restored following the extradition of these
criminals to the Kuomintang.259 There were more examples showing that the
municipal police shut down communist meetings and assassination corps merely
based on the information provided by the Chinese authorities in the Police
Intelligence Reports.260
Moreover, arrests with court warrants continued to be practiced by the municipal
police. Provided that warrants were issued by the Settlement Court at the request of
the Chinese authorities, communists would be taken into custody regardless of their
ranks and identities. Tsiang Khe Zung 蔣開成, whose name appeared in the court
warrant possessed by the Chinese Public Service Bureau, was arrested by the
municipal police on 27th March, 1934.261 The accused was suspected to be a
communist because his name was found in a name list possessed by a communist
prisoner arrested by the Chinese authorities. Also, influential communists could not
avoid being arrested if their personal particulars matched the details stated in
warrants. The case against the Kiangsu Provisional Committee 江蘇省中央政治局
of the Chinese Communist Party on 26th June, 1934 was a good example as stated in
the evaluation report of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics in Taipei. Three
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hours before the arrest, Chinese intelligence agents Pan Zhe 潘哲, Chen Shuping 陳
叔平 and You Dingyi 游定一 provided accurate the address and other relevant
materials of communist suspects to the Settlement in order to apply for arrest a
warrant 簽辦排票.262 The Shanghai Municipal Police would initiate this arrest after
receiving a warrant from the court. Although Chinese intelligence agents were still
doubtful of the willingness of the municipal police to cooperate at first,
apprehensions were eventually carried out in Chengtu and Gordon Roads Districts
successfully.263 The secretary general Li Zhusheng 李竹聲, the chief of organisation
department Yang Tiansheng 楊天生, the president of All-China Federation of Trade
Unions Yuan Jiayong 袁家鏞 and at least other ten communists were taken into
custody. Plenty of documents and radio appliances were seized. Names of communist
suspects matched with details written in arrest warrants. All of them were finally
handed over to the Chinese authorities.264 Since the collapse of the Kiangsu
Provisional Committee and especially Li Zhusheng’s surrender in June 1934, no
major communist headquarters were re-established due to heavy surveillance of the
Settlement and the Chinese authorities. From then on, communists could only
survive in Shanghai through taking part in patriotic campaigns against
imperialism.265
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Yet, there were limitations if law enforcement officers solely relying on details of
warrants during apprehensions. In some conditions, the municipal police failed to
execute warrants because a person stated in a warrant was absent. On 31st March,
1932, a reactionary called Doo Tien I’h 杜天一 was wanted by the Public Safety
Bureau. Armed with court warrants no. 4106 and 4107, the municipal police and
representatives of the Public Safety Bureau raided Burlington Hotel at 305 Bubbling
Well Road. However, before the arrival of the policemen, Doo had had left his room
in the previous evening.266 Knowing that the arrest was in vain, the municipal police
had to return the search warrant to the Court.267 Worse still, hardly could policemen
confirm the identity of the accused in accordance with the information stated in the
warrant. This was because the accused may intentionally provide false information to
policemen. After experiencing a failure to arrest a communist, detective sergeant
Moore illustrated the difficulty of executing the warrant.

… for apart from the name or names contained thereon we have no means
of identifying the wanted persons. There is nothing to prevent a wanted
man giving a false name and we have no means at our disposal to disprove
his words for invariably the Public Safety Bureau detectives know nothing
of the person wanted and less of his habitual address.268
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As shown from the above source, neither could the municipal police nor the Public
Security Bureau verify a statement made by an accused because of the lack of
evidence. Therefore, it could be inferred that the failure of apprehensions caused by
judicial restrictions led to Settlement policemen’s violation in legal procedures when
arresting communists in the future.
Given that the formal apprehension method could not make arrests become
effective, the municipal police decided to carry out arrests through ignoring details of
warrants. Although Yao Yuan argues that there were serious legal confrontations
between the Chinese government and the International Settlement after the
establishment of the Shanghai Special District Court in the early 1930s, Yuan never
analyses the antagonism between senior officials of the municipal council and their
police force.269 The first example that illustrates the rejection of the court order was
to execute an expired warrant against a communist printing work called Dah Dong
大同印刷局 in September 1931. Issued by the court on 22nd August, 1931, the
warrant was only valid for a short period of time. However, failing to implement the
warrant at once, the Special Branch not only refused to return the unused warrant to
the court, but they even deferred the arrest to more than two weeks later.
Subsequently, nine people were arrested. Plenty of reactionary literature was
seized.270 Noticing the violation of legal procedures, deputy commissioner (crime)
not only doubted the legitimacy of the search held by the Special Branch with an
expired warrant, but he also reemphasised to his colleagues that “the first duty of any
officers who has a warrant to execute is to ascertain its contents to act in accordance
269
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with”.271 Nevertheless, detective inspector J.W. Prince defended their violation by
explaining that his men and the Chinese officers had to “keep the place under
surveillance until an opportune time availed.” He also attributed the delay to the late
response of the Chinese authorities.272 Eventually, two of the accused were
extradited to the Chinese authorities.273
Aside from executing an expired warrant, the Special Branch also arrested people
whose names did not appear in warrants. Acting on the authority of search warrants
issued at the instance of the Public Security Bureau, the Special Branch attempted to
find a communist called Tsiang Na Soong 蔣耐松, and “the person in charge of the
Four Combined Bookstore 四合書局” at Foochow Road in late January 1931. It was
suspected that Tsiang Na Soong was seeking refuge inside the abovementioned book
shop. After their arrival, the policemen were told that the manager was absent. As a
result, Special Branch officers arrested a shop assistant called Er Lai-zoong 歐來崇,
who was temporarily in charge of the bookstore.274 Yet, even the assistant municipal
advocate Mr. Paul Y. Ru 汝保彝 who worked for the Shanghai Municipal Council
condemned the Chinese authorities and the municipal police. It was because they
apprehended an innocent shopkeeper with a warrant without stating the name of the
actual person they wanted. According to Mr. Ru, arresting people with a nameless
warrant was actually contrary to the Chinese criminal procedures.275 In fact, this was
not the only incident for the Special Branch to go against the advice made by the
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municipal advocate concerning arrests of communists. The municipal advocate King
S. Kum requested the municipal police should never prosecute any bookstore
managers selling the reactionary literature unless policemen could prove that
“offenders” knowingly and intentionally propagated doctrines opposite to the
People’s Three Principles. Mr. Kum further illustrated that “failure to examine books
by the manager before the same is offered for sale is not sufficient to constitute an
offence.”276 Ironically, in response to Mr. Kum’s suggestion, the Chief of Special
Branch T.P. Givens [Please refer to appendix 6] ordered his men to ignore the above
advice, on the condition that they were executing warrants issued by the Shanghai
Special District Court at the instance of the Chinese authorities.277 Apparently,
although the Special Branch had to violate the legal procedures, they was willing to
provide their assistance to the Chinese government when arresting communists.
Apart from bookstore assistants, the Special Branch also employed similar
methods to arrest well-known communist leaders. Chen Tou Seu 陳獨秀, one of the
founders of the Chinese Communist Party, was wanted by the Chinese government.
Possessed with the court warrant against Zai Zau-san and “ten other associated
people”, the Shanghai Municipal Police and the Public Safety Bureau arrested Zai
Siau-san 謝少珊 and his four comrades at 210 Tshung Yang Li, East Yuhang Road,
on 15th October, 1932.278 During interrogation, Zai Siau-san not only betrayed his
comrades by telling the policemen residential addresses of other communists in the
Settlement, but he was also willing to report the confidential information to General
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Jiang Jieshi in person.279 As a result, on 16th and 17th October, the municipal police,
the Chinese authorities and French policemen jointly raided four more places located
in two foreign concessions and arrested six more communists, including Chen Tou
Seu. However, these convicts were rejected to employ any lawyers for their defences.
Some accused protested emphatically to the court concerning the unjust legal
procedure of the arrest. The 7th accused Wong Siau-tsung 王曉普 showed his strong
remonstrance to the judge:
There is no warrant for my arrest. The police arrested me on the off
chance that I may have been also concerned in the case against the other
accused and I have not been given the chance to protect myself. I now
speak in order that I may be afforded that opportunity. There is no
warrant issued for my arrest.280
The judge not only failed to raise any concrete charges against the accused with
flimsy evidence, but he also acquiesced the municipal police to apprehend people
based on a warrant only stating the name of Zai Siau-san. Eventually, the Shanghai
Special District Court agreed to extradite all eleven accused to the Chinese
authorities, in spite of the fact that it had the authority to try this case in the
Settlement. In order to thank for the efforts made by the municipal police, General
Jiang Jieshi decided to reward the Settlement authorities by providing special bonus
to the Settlement through the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
Eighteen policemen and clerks, fourteen of which belonged to the Special Branch,
shared a total of four thousand dollars.281
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Last but not least, the municipal police sometimes even apprehended communists
without applying for any warrants. The municipal police received a phone call from
the Chinese authority on 17th July, 1932. Knowing that Hyui Se Kung 徐錫根 was
an important offender wanted by the Nanjing government, a Special Branch
policeman and his two colleagues of the Louza Police Station immediately joined
representatives of the Public Safety Bureau who were waiting outside Room 5 of the
Tsing Soo Lodging House at Hupeh Road..282 Subsequently, Hyui Se Kung and his
comrade Hu Tung Sheng 胡同聲 were taken into custody during the raid. Not until
the arrest was over did the municipal police advise the Public Security Bureau to
procure a warrant from the Court on 18th July. They were handed over to the Chinese
authorities afterwards.283 Another example was shown in the arrest of a communist
agent called Wong Kyung San 王金山 for distributing the reactionary literature on
9th August, 1932.284 Two Public Service Bureau policemen visited the West
Hongkew Station at 5.50am and requested Settlement policemen at the station to
provide assistance to arrest Wong. When challenged for their failure to present a
warrant from the court, these Chinese police officers emphasised that detective
inspector Ross of the Special Branch “waived the matter” and asked them to carry on
the arrest without a warrant.285 Eventually, Wong was apprehended in the room
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located at East Dong Ka Loong. The extradition of Wong to the Chinese territory was
permitted by the Settlement Court on 12th August, 1932.286
In conclusion, it is hoped that this chapter can provide contributions to the
academic arena in the following two directions. I argue that the increasing
cooperation between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities after the surrender of
Gu Shunzhang was in the form of illegal arrests. Not only did Settlement policemen
actively initiate more raids on different communist bases, but they also made arrests
become more effective and efficient by ignoring the legal authority of the Settlement
Court. The simplified arrest procedure would favour both the Kuomintang and
foreign concessions to consolidate their power in Shanghai.
The second offering that this chapter furnishes is to discuss the role of imperial
policing in the early 20th century. In this chapter, I suggest that the municipal police
themselves had to actively participate in suppressing communist activities with the
Chinese authorities for the sake of the Settlement’s survival. Also, I argue that
readjustments of the British imperial policies in China were not uninterrupted in the
process. The determination of municipal advocates and some senior police officers in
defending the criminal procedure depicted their attempts to maintain their values and
privilege in China. It took some time for British settlers to adapt to changing
circumstances in China in the 1920s.
This chapter about arrest reveals the beginning of British readjustments in China
and paves the way for illustrating treatments of communists in the forms of the
extradition and the reformatory.
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CHAPTER 4
EXTRADITION
“… as they [Shanghai Municipal Police] are conducting the prosecution in a case in which the
Chinese authorities are directly interested, the British authorities are not in a position to intervene… if
we were to become a party to the arrangement proposed we may, in the absence of any satisfactory
guarantee to the contrary, find ourselves accused, in the Soviet press and elsewhere, of an attempt to
defeat the ends of justice and making Chinese national interests subservient to our own narrower
interests.”287
J.P. Brenan (The British Consul in Shanghai)

This chapter emphasises the weakened judicial autonomy of the Settlement when
the Shanghai Municipal Police was requested to extradite different people to the
Chinese authorities. Although communists arrested in the settlement would be tried
in the Shanghai Provisional Court, the Kuomintang authorities always insisted the
settlement policemen to hand over communist convicts to them. By doing so, the
Kuomintang hoped to suppress communist activities effectively. Nevertheless,
extradition requests unavoidably infringed the legal independence of the
International Settlement which was protected by the extraterritoriality. In the existing
literature, the extradition of criminals in Shanghai during the republican era has
largely been ignored. Most literature mainly focuses on the alliance between the
Settlement and the Chinese authorities to suppress communist and reactionary
activities. Frederic Wakeman and Patricia Stranahan suggest that there was an
increasing cooperation between different police forces in Shanghai after the Gu
Shunzhang affair.288 But never do they discuss mechanisms for arrest and extradition
procedures in detail. Perhaps Yao Yuan is the only one attempted to analyse how the
extradition procedure worked in the Shanghai Special District Court after 1930.
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Indeed, many foreign judicial privileges were cancelled when the British and the
Chinese authorities signed the second rendition agreement. However, the Shanghai
Municipal Police still preserved the prosecution power in the Settlement Court. As
Yao notes, the Shanghai Municipal Police was still in its position to defend foreign
interests in the Settlement. With a view to protecting its limited legal authority, the
municipal police would use the reason of insufficient prima facie to reject extradition
requests in some communist cases, such as Chen Rongxi 陳榮喜 in 1930. When the
municipal police believed that someone like Deng Yanda 鄧演達 threatened the
security of the Settlement, they were very happy to hand over him to the Chinese
authorities despite lack of evidence.289 However, Yao mainly relies on memoirs
written by a former municipal advocate and legal reports published by the Council.
In her research, she never makes good use of any official dispatches and private
correspondences written between British diplomatic officials, the secretary of
Shanghai Municipal Council, municipal advocates and senior police officers, let
alone court proceedings records and crime diaries in the SMP Special branch files.
She largely ignores the fact that the Settlement authorities were deprived of their
extradition power by the late 1920s. After reading the British Foreign Office files, the
Secretariat files of the Shanghai Municipal Council and the SMP Special Branch files,
I argue that the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force relinquished their
judicial autonomy to extradite non-residents and bona-fide residents as a result of
diplomatic pressure from Britain and China in the late 1920s.
Non-residents
Due to the neutrality of the International Settlement, many Chinese convicts fled
to the Settlement for protection after committing crimes in Chinese territory.
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Regarding non-residents as outsiders of the Settlement, the Shanghai Municipal
Police never cared about their safety. After confirming that any criminals were
associated with cases in Chinese territory, the Shanghai Municipal Police would
extradite these convicts to the Chinese authorities. This practice was also applicable
to communists seeking refuge in the Settlement.290 Nevertheless, according to Police
Advocate Mr. R.T. Bryan, non-residents had to be tried in the settlement court before
being handed over to the Chinese authorities. Some evidence was required when
applying for extradition.291 Hsia Jen-chang was one of examples illustrating how the
extradition procedure worked in a non-resident context. Being a close follower of a
Hankow communist leader called Chen Yien-nien, Hsia was arrested by the Shanghai
Municipal Police in July 1927 based on the request of the Chinese authorities. The
suspect failed to prove his residential address in the Settlement after his arrest. The
policemen proved that Hsia was a paymaster supporting communist activities in
Shanghai because $3,8000 cash was discovered in his canvas bag.292 Therefore, the
court ordered the settlement authority to hand over Hsia and his money to the
Chinese Special Military Court. General Yang Hu decided to execute Hsia in the
Lunghua jail 龍華監獄 on 19th July, 1927.293 Apparently, the Shanghai Municipal
Police would not oppose any extradition requests for non-residents if the Chinese
authorities could present some evidence in the settlement court.
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Extraditing non-residents was not uncommon in Shanghai throughout the late
1920s. Whilst preparing for a report of criminal condition in the Settlement,
commissioner of police E.I.M. Barret showed the figure of extradited communists to
the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Seventy-two suspected
Communists were handed over to the Chinese Authorities between 13th April, 1927
and 21st February, 1928.294 [Please refer to appendix 8 and 9] This could reflect the
generosity of the municipal police to extradite communist suspects to the Chinese
government.
Nevertheless, feeling anxious to eliminate communists, the Chinese government
was not satisfied with existing extradition arrangements regulated by the
International Settlement. The Chinese authorities suggested that when extraditing
communist criminals who were not residents of the Settlement, extradition request
should be exempt from any trials.295 Apparently, the judicial autonomy of the
Settlement would have been damaged if the Settlement Police accepted this demand.
After considering the pros and cons of the proposal raised by the Chinese
authorities, the Shanghai Municipal Police showed its consent to them.
Commissioner E.I.M. Barret understood that rejecting Chinese requests would hinder
the cooperation between Chinese and Settlement policemen in Shanghai. He was
afraid that the Chinese authorities would retaliate against the municipal police by
prolonging the process for extraditing criminals wanted by the municipal police. In
his opinion, only by providing a reciprocal arrangement could the municipal police
294
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obtained necessary assistance from its Chinese counterparts in the future.296 It was
his hope that the Chinese authorities could also provide effective assistance when the
municipal police requested the extradition of some gangsters fled to Chinese
territory.297 Indeed, the Chinese authorities also played a significant role in
maintaining the law and order in the Settlement. According to Barret, 116 criminals
were extradited from Chinese territory to the Settlement between May and November
in 1928.298 Therefore, the municipal police certainly could not lose such an
important ally when policing the International Settlement.
More importantly, the British imperial presence would have been threatened if the
settlement failed to settle the discontent of the Chinese authorities about their
extradition requests. E.I.M. Barret warned the Shanghai Municipal Council about the
outcome for refusing extradition demands raised by the Chinese authorities. Not only
would the International Settlement be regarded as “a base for the dissemination of
communist propaganda”, but the Nationalist government might also be encouraged to
accelerate its diplomatic process for abolishing extraterritorial rights.299 In fact, there
were no exaggerations for the assumption made by Commissioner E.I.M. Barret.
According to the political intelligence report printed in July 1927, reliable
intelligence disclosed that the Nationalist government had a strong determination to
regain its control in two foreign concessions in Shanghai. During a meeting in the
General Chamber of Commerce, General Jiang Jieshi told Chinese merchants that he
would not only carry out reforms in Chinese territory, but he would also attempt to
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restore the Shanghai International Settlement within three years.300 Therefore,
failing to extraditing the non-residents to the Chinese would possibly cause adverse
effects on foreign interests in Shanghai.
Subsequently, Commissioner E.I.M. Barret drafted a proposal to the Shanghai
Municipal Council showing how compromises would be made in response to the
Chinese authorities’ request. He recommended that the Commissioner of Police
should be entitled to extradite any political offenders who were not living in the
Settlement for more than six months. On this occasion, it was not essential for a
suspected communist to undergo a long legal process which would delay his / her
extradition to the Chinese authorities.301 Believing that the Commissioner of Police
should never have such “privilege”, the Police Prosecuting Solicitor R.T. Bryan
emphatically opposed to this proposal.302 Yet, Commissioner E.I.M. Barret’s
resolution was eventually accepted. The Shanghai Municipal Police could extradite
communist suspects who were not residents of the Settlement to the Kuomintang
authorities without undergoing any legal process. In 1931, the new Commissioner of
Police R.M.J. Martin even authorised divisional officers and Special Branch officers
to handle extradition cases of communists in the Settlement since 1931.303
The case of Tsang Ong Lai and Au Sai Ts in April 1933 illustrated how Barret’s
proposal was implemented. Informed by other communist convicts arrested earlier,
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the Public Security Bureau requested the municipal police to extradite Tsang Ong Lai
and Au Sai Ts who were associated in communist activities in Chinese territory.304
Living in the settlement for less than one year, both Tsang and Au failed to prove
their residential addresses in the Settlement.305 During interrogation, although both
suspects denied involving in any communist cases, they admitted that they knew one
of communist convicts called Hong Tuh Sung. Hong was apprehended by the
Chinese authorities previously. Persuaded by this evidence, senior police officers of
the B division extradited these two suspects to the Public Safety Bureau without
undergoing any legal procedures.306 In the face of the Chinese nationalism, the
judicial autonomy of the Settlement was infringed as the municipal police had to
meet the Kuomintang’s demands in extraditing non-residents without undergoing
formal legal procedures. However, this was not the only example to reveal the failure
of the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force in defending their legal
independence.
Bona fide residents
After the completion of the northern expedition, surrenders of other warlords
provided an opportunity for Jiang Jieshi to concentrate his efforts to suppress
communist activities. Many communists in Chinese territory in Shanghai were killed
in the famous “Shanghai massacre of 1927” which was initiated by Jiang. Yet, this
did not mean the end of the spread of communism in Shanghai. The Kuomintang
attempted to eliminate the remaining of communists seeking refuges in foreign
concessions. In February 1928, the Commissioner of Foreign affairs for Kiangsu Quo
Tai-chi sent a letter to the International Settlement, warning the Council about the
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intrusion of communists in the International Settlement.

…having no way of executing their projects in Chinese territory where
strict precaution is taken, they (communists) are posting slogans and
conducting a counter propaganda campaign in the Settlement... there is
a likelihood of the public order being menaced.307
The Kuomintang hoped that the Shanghai Municipal Council and consular bodies
could take necessary measures to suppress the spread of communism in the
International Settlement. Subsequently, the Chinese authorities even urged the
municipal police to extradite their bona fide residents who were suspected of
engaging in communist activities in Chinese territory. After receiving a request from
the Chinese military authorities, the Commissioner of Police sought instructions from
the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council to decide whether it was legitimate
to hand over a well-known resident to the Kuomintang.308 Nevertheless, such
request inevitably violated the law in the Settlement because “only under the most
exceptional circumstances would the council permit any resident in the Settlement to
be handed over directly to the Chinese authorities”.309 Moreover, these residents
must be taken before the Provisional Court. Only a strong prima facie case would the
court consider to extradite residents to the Chinese authorities.310 The police
advocate Mr. Bryan even suspected that the Kuomintang had some “ulterior motives”
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to request the extradition of their residents.311 Abiding by legal practices of the
Settlement, the municipal police therefore refused the request raised by the Chinese
garrison commander.
As a matter of fact, bona fide residents had long enjoyed the judicial protection in
since the Shanghai International Settlement was established. They were always
considered by the Court as a very important factor. Therefore, they were given
special privileges to be tried by the Mixed Court. According to the legal tradition of
the Settlement, a great difference was found in extraditing bona fide residents and
non-residents. When asking for the extradition of non residents, the Chinese
authorities just had to provide “some evidence” to support the charge. On the
contrary, handing over bona-fide residents required a substantial prima facie case.312
Apparently, it was extremely difficult to demand the extradition of the bona-fide
residents who were well-protected by the judiciary system of the Settlement.
The failure to settle the extradition of bona-fide residents unavoidably caused
endless quarrels between the Chinese and the Settlement authorities as reflected in
the court proceedings. In August 1927, a 53 year-old Chinese Pawnbroker called Ong
Tah Yuen, who had lived in the Settlement for over 32 years, was put in a trial in the
Shanghai Provisional Court by a Chinese soldier. [Please refer to appendix 10] The
Provisional Court ordered the Shanghai Municipal Police to hand over Ong to the
Chinese government because evidence showed that Ong knew a famous communist
called Cheu Chien.313 Considering that the evidence was insufficient to reveal the

311

“Suggest re charges in rendition agreement” in Chinese courts in the settlement and French
Concession, 1929, ref. I.O. 7245 in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944,
(Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), 10
312
“Suggest re charges in rendition agreement” in Chinese courts in the settlement and French
Concession, 1929, ref. I.O. 7245 in Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944,
(Wilmington, Del. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), 10
313
“Letter written by General Yang Hu re Hung Tai-Nyeu on 13th August, 1927” in Police Daily
Reports, 1st July-30th September, 1927, 151-152
94

connection between the accused and any communistic affiliations, the consular
deputy emphatically opposed to the Judge’s decision.314
Therefore, similar conflicts continued to take place in the Provisional Court
between 1927 and 1929. In spite of Chinese representatives’ endeavours to prove
linkages between plenty of residents and communist activities in Chinese territory,
the Shanghai Municipal Police and the consular deputies still refused to extradite
bona fide residents to the Chinese authorities. Indeed, whether the prima facie
evidence was sufficient to allow extradition depended on the interpretation of the
consular deputies. Meanwhile, the Provisional Court was subject to the influence of
the Chinese government after 1926 as a result of the rise the Chinese nationalism.
Indeed, according to Tahirih Lee, Chinese merchants and officials wanted to put the
settlement court under their control but at the same time “retained its western-style
procedures and its freedom to enforce local laws and customs”.315 In 1927, their
wish came true when the Provisional Court formally replaced the International
Mixed Court. Magistrates in the court were appointed by the Kuomintang
government. It was true that judges failing to accomplish “missions” of the higher
Chinese authorities would be punished by the Chinese government. The Provisional
Court president Lu Xingyuan 盧興源 was dismissed on 9th October 1927 because of
his failure to hand over a number of alleged “communist” residents in the Settlement
to General Bai Chongxi 白崇禧. Knowing that the judicial independence of the
Provisional Court was seriously infringed as reflected in this dismissal, the consular
bodies unanimously complained to the Chinese government. This could show how
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tense the condition was as a result of the controversy of extradition.316 Neither
Settlement policemen nor the Chinese authorities were willing to give way to each
other. Deadlock remained between these two parties.
Perhaps sometimes it was the fault of the Chinese authorities for abusing the
extradition procedures in order to suppress reactionaries in Shanghai. However I
argue that political factors were main obstacles hindering the extradition of bona fide
residents. Firstly, it was the obligation of the Shanghai Municipal Council to offer
protections to its bona fide residents as they were usually taxpayers of the Shanghai
International Settlement. During the visit of the British Minister to China Sir Mile
Lampson in 1929, the former chairman of the council Mr. Fessenden explained to
Lampson concerning the issue of protecting residents of the Settlement.

…the Chinese residents in the settlement were entitled, in return for
the payment of municipal rates and taxes, to the fullest measure of
protection the municipal authorities were able to afford them, that if
they did not receive this protection they would be liable to be “bled
white” by their own authorities, and that in that case property values in
the settlement would slump disastrously.317
Therefore, in the council’s perspective, residents who contributed to the economic
prosperity of the International Settlement should deserve the protection from the
International Settlement regardless of their nationalities and races.
More importantly, the principle of political neutrality had long been upheld by the
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Mixed Court since the establishment of the Shanghai International Settlement. On
19th August, 1927, when the Chinese military authorities requested the extradition of
nine Chinese residents of the Settlement on suspicion of engaging in communist
activities, consular deputy Stevens declined their demand. He emphasised that the
political neutrality of the Settlement should never be submitted to Chinese military
factions.318
Actually, the Mixed Court and the consular bodies had had a tradition in not taking
sides when dealing with political cases before 1927. As A. M. Kotenev pointed out in
his book Shanghai: Its mixed court and council in 1925, “it [the Mixed Court]’s
jurisdiction was localised strictly to a Treaty territory, which in its very substance
was neutral as a portion of land set aside for the residence of foreign merchants,
peaceful traders, but not politicians and belligerents.”319 Even though there was
sufficient prima facie evidence, the Settlement still did not have to “warrant the
unconditional surrender of the accused to the native authorities.”320 The case of
Wong Tsz-ting in October 1913 could illustrate the importance of the neutrality
stated by the consular deputies. Wong was wanted by the Chinese government
because he was suspected of agitating disturbances against the Republic of China.
Knowing that Wong was a bona fide resident of the settlement, magistrates of the
Mixed Court transferred this case to the consular bodies because such political
accusation was outside the jurisdiction of the Court.321 Instead of authorising
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extradition, the consular body eventually expelled this political offender outside the
Settlement.322
In fact, Shanghai was not the only British concession receiving extradition
requests from the Kuomintang authorities after the completion of the Northern
Expedition. As early as in late 1927, the British Commissioner of Weihaiwei 威海衛
Reginald Johnston 莊士敦 was urged by the Chinese authorities in Shandong 山東
to provide assistance to arrest and to extradite ten Chinese communist suspects to
Chinese officials.323 Similar to the response of the Shanghai Municipal Council,
Reginald Johnston was sceptical towards the Kuomintang’s requests not only
because Chinese prosecution authorities failed to present convincing evidence, but
also because the ruthless and barbaric Chinese government “obeyed no law” in their
governance. As a responsible government, the British authorities in Weihaiwei
refused to hand over any of their temporary or permanent residents on suspicion of
engaging in communist activities to the Kuomintang in order not to create any
innocent cases.324 However, how to settle the discontent of the Chinese authorities
was also one of major concerns of Reginald Johnston. Eventually, with a view to
proving that Weihaiwei was not a reactionary base against the Kuomintang, Reginald
Johnston decided to banish any people wanted by the Chinese government, provided
that evidence was shown.325 Therefore, British officials in Weihaiwei actually shared
similar neutral perspective with the International Settlement in Shanghai concerning
322
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the extraditions of political offenders when the Kuomintang first rose to power in
1927. The British concession in Weihaiwei was finally returned to China in 1930,
allowing the Kuomintang to control over the entire Shandong province.
Until June 1929, the International Settlement still firmly kept their commitments
towards their bona-fide residents and upheld their principle of political neutrality in
China. Then, who could make a change on the policy of the Settlement authorities?
In the face of the diplomatic pressure from the Nationalist government, the British
Foreign Office understood that its foreign policies in China must be changed.
Interfering in municipal administrations of the Shanghai Settlement was needed
although British officials recognised insecure sentiments among British communities
in Shanghai. The Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain reminded his colleagues
about the need to make diplomatic concession for China.326 As mentioned in chapter
2, the settlement court had undergone significant transformations even before the
Kuomintang rose to power. In 1930, not only were magistrates and important
administrative personnel in the courts appointed by the Nationalist government,327
but interventions of the consular representatives were also cancelled in the court.328
The settlement court inevitably gave judgments favouring the interest of the
Nationalist government when handling political cases. On the other hand, the
Shanghai Municipal Council and the diplomatic bodies could not openly oppose
326
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decisions made by the court. Despite its reluctance, the council theoretically had to
follow the orders given by the court to hand over communists to China.
Apart from revising the legal system of the Settlement, the British Foreign Office
even sent its officials to pressure British expatriates in Shanghai. The British
Minister to China Sir Miles Lampson visited Shanghai in May 1929. With a view to
preventing the intensification of anti-foreign sentiments, Lampson persuaded the
chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council H.E. Arnhold, and the police advocate
Mr. Bryan to abandon their stubbornness in protecting Chinese residents.

…it had never been the policy of His Majesty’s Government that
Chinese residents in the Settlement should be withdrawn from the
jurisdiction of their own authorities, and that in our view the paramount
consideration in the problem of the provisional court was the
maintenance of law and order in the Settlement by the municipal
authorities, which did not prima facie appear to include the protection of
Chinese residents against the operation of Chinese courts.329
Finally, they reached an agreement. It was unnecessary for the Shanghai Municipal
Council to protect their residents against the orders of the Shanghai Provisional
Court, provided that these orders were given following due legal process and not by
external administrative action.330

in China by pleasing the Chinese at the expense of the judicial autonomy of the
International Settlement. The extradition of Settlement residents in the 1930s echoes
what Robert Bickers argues concerning the British government’s nationalisation of

329

Sir M. Lampson, “Foreign Office Confidential Print copy of dispatch dated 5 th June 1929 from Sir
Miles Lampson at the British Legation in Peking to Sir Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign Office in
London”, number FO405/262 no.60 (1929:F3591/1148/10), ibid, 349-350
330
Ibid
100

Sino-British relations between the late 1920s and the early 1940s.331 There is no
doubt that the Settlement authorities were abandoned by the British Foreign Office.
Weakened judicial power of British expatriates also connects to the argument raised
by Edumnd Fung. He believes that Whitehall policy-makers had prepared for gradual
transfer of power from Britain to China. By doing so, Britain wanted to maintain a
stable political condition in China, allowing British commercial interest to growth in
the inter-war period.332
Without supports from the British Foreign Office, the council had to hand over its
Chinese residents to the Chinese authorities if the Kuomintang could provide enough
evidence to support the charges. Holding the despatch warrant issued by the
Shanghai Special District Court, the Soongwu Military Headquarters asked for the
extradition of Wong I’h Bae living at 93 Annam Road in the Settlement in April 1931.
During the arrest, the municipal police and the Chinese authorities failed to find
Wong when they reached the above address. Instead, Lee Sau Chi, who claimed
himself as a translator of a bookstore and resided in the Settlement for 1.5 year, was
discovered in the premises. Plenty of communist literature was seized in his
premise.333 He was then taken to the court for trial afterwards. Military officers of
the Soongwu command not only showed a testimony of a communist convict called
Zoh Tsing Ih, but they also presented a telegram sent from Hunan 湖南 proving that
Lee was the chairman of the Hunan Soviet Communist.334 The police advocate Mr.
Kum had no objection to hand over the accused based on evidence provided by the
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Chinese authorities. Finally, Lee Sau Chi was extradited to the Chinese authorities on
4th May, 1931.335
In short, the Shanghai Municipal Council not only lost its judicial autonomy in
protecting their Chinese residents, but it was also deprived of its principle of political
neutrality which was established in the mid-19th century.
The jurisdiction of the Settlement
Undoubtedly, jurisdiction was the most crucial component guaranteed in the
extraterritoriality which protected foreign interests in China. The police advocate Mr.
Bryan pinpointed that “A crime committed in the International Settlement is triable
in the Provisional Court only unless the complainant is a French citizen.”336 The
judicial independence in the Settlement was still secured after the Rendition
Agreement was signed between Britain and China in 1926. Clause 1, section 1 of the
Rendition Agreement stated that “with the exceptional of cases which in accordance
with the treaties involve the right of Consular jurisdiction, all civil and criminal cases
in the Settlement shall be dealt with by the said Provisional Court.”337
Before experiencing the diplomatic pressure from Britain, the Shanghai Municipal
Council stood firm to uphold the court’s jurisdiction limit for cases created in the
Settlement. The Settlement authorities even ignored the extradition requests from the
Chinese authority. In September 1928, 23 students and agitators were arrested by the
municipal police because they distributed inflammatory, rebellious and communistic
pamphlets on the street. Chinese Garrison Commanders asked for the extradition of
these Chinese. The Provisional Court, which was under the influence of the Chinese
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authorities, allowed the extradition.338 However, the police advocate Mr. Bryan
regarded this extradition order as void and invalid because the court had no right, and
power to order defendants to be handed over to China provided that this crime was
committed inside the Settlement.339 The consular deputy Stevens also emphasised
that the Provisional Court in the Settlement shared equal status with other courts in
Chinese territory.340 Therefore, on 6th September, 1928, Commissioner of Police Mr.
Barret not only refused to extradite the suspects to the Chinese Authorities, but also
demanded the Provisional Court to try this case.341
Sometimes, even Chinese magistrates working for the Nationalist government also
upheld the legitimacy of the Provisional Court to execute its legal authority in the
International Settlement. They thought some of the Kuomintang’s extradition
requests were unreasonable. On 9th December 1928, 28 people were arrested at 877
Peking Road in the International Settlement because their premises contained plenty
of posters and pamphlets which were anti-capitalists, anti-government and
communist in nature.342 Jiang Jieshi informed the provisional court that these
convicts were important communists and had to be extradited to the Chinese
authorities.343 However, the Public Safety Bureau failed to present any evidence
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showing that these convicts were associated with any crimes in Chinese territory.344
Not only did the Shanghai Municipal Police and the consular deputies oppose the
extradition request,345 but the judge of the appeal court He Shizhen 何世楨 also
explicitly showed his disagreement to the Chinese authorities. With a view to
defending the spirit of the judicial independence of the Settlement court and the
reputation of the Chinese government, He Shizhen believed that the Shanghai
Provisional Court, which was entitled by the Chinese government to handle cases
inside the settlement, was in its position to try this case which had no connections
with any crimes in Chinese territory.346 The consular deputy S.L. Burdett also
showed his consent to He Shizhen.347 Eventually, all convicts were released except
one person called Wang qing 王清.
Nevertheless, such impregnable principle was challenged when people wanted by
the Chinese authorities were significant to the intelligence of communist activities in
China. The case of Mr. and Mrs. Noulens was a good example to illustrate the
judicial infringement of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Mr. and Mrs. Noulens, who
resided in the settlement for fifteen months, were arrested by the Shanghai Municipal
Police according to the intelligence provided by the police force in Singapore in 1931.
[Please refer to appendix 11]

344

He Shizhen 何世楨，“電覆總司令蔣陳述共黨二十八名一案經過情形”Reporting to Jiang Jieshi
concerning the cases of 28 communist convicts, 5th February, 1929, ref: 126, ibid, 3
345
He Shizhen 何世楨，“代電呈蔣主席為移解二十八名共黨一案未能執行由”Explaining to Jiang
Jieshi concerning the failure to extradite 28 communist convicts, 7th February, 1929, ref: 129, ibid, 14
346
He Shizhen 何世楨，“電覆總司令蔣陳述共黨二十八名一案經過情形”Reporting to Jiang Jieshi
concerning the cases of 28 communist convicts, 5th February, 1929, ref: 126, ibid, 3; He Shizhen 何世
楨，“代電呈蔣主席為移解二十八名共黨一案未能執行由”Explaining to Jiang Jieshi concerning the
failure to extradite 28 communist convicts 7th February, 1929, ref: 129, ibid, 12; He Shizhen 何世楨，
My memory of the Shanghai Provisional Court〈記上海公共租界臨時法院〉，Lu jianxin 陸堅心、
WanYan Shaoyuan 完顔紹元，Ershi Shiji Shasnghai Wenshi Ziliao Wenku Shi《20 世紀上海文史資
料文庫 10》20th century Shanghai literature archive，(Shanghai：Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 1999),
80
347
Shanghai Municipal Police, Police Daily Report 1st January-30th June, 1929, 6th January, 1929,
ref: U1-1-1160, 6
104

Indeed, it was undeniable that Mr. Noulens not only communicated with different
communists in China, but he was also connected with communists overseas. Plenty
of confidential communist documents were discovered in his apartments. Maps
indicating locations of communist army and nationalist army in China, illustrations
on the internal structure of workmen’s factories in Shanghai, correspondence written
between red unions and the Far Eastern Head Office of the communist party were
also found in his personal belongings. Based on testimonies made by surrendered
communists, the Chinese Garrison authorities believed that Noulens sent communists
to reinforce the red army in Kiangsi and remitted money to support local communist
activities in different part of China. He also rented several apartments for unknown
purposes.348 Understanding the importance of Noulens with the Chinese Communist
Party, the Chinese authorities requested the extradition of this couple and prepared to
put them under trial at a Chinese military court. This couple was charged of
“infringing the safety of the Republic of China”. The Shanghai Special District Court
allowed the extradition request but the accused were still taken into custody in the
Settlement, pending on the verification of their nationalities.
Although Noulen had a close connection with Chinese communists, it was
debatable to hand over him and his wife to the Chinese authority. Apparently, the
accused committed their crimes in the Settlement without directly visiting Chinese
territory in person. Dr. Wilhlem, who was the lawyer of the couple, challenged the
validity of the extradition order because his clients never went to China’s inland
provinces. “How could they have committed aggressions in the Kiangsi and other
provinces?”349 Besides, the Kiangsu 2nd Branch High Court was entitled to deal with
348
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the cases created in the Settlement by virtue of article 2 of the new Provisional Court
Agreement.350 The municipal police not only insisted that the case of Noulens was
within the jurisdiction of the International Settlement and but it also urged the
Kiangsu 2nd Branch High Court to deny the request made by the Chinese Garrison
authorities.351
Meanwhile, the arrest of Noulen and his wife became a hot topic in the British
metropole. In accordance with Antoinette Burton and Andrew Thompson, pressure
groups in Britain always urged the government to carry out reforms by drawing upon
imperial matters from the Empire.352 After Noulen and his wife were extradited, the
British authorities still received complains and suggestions from pressure groups.
The League Against Imperialism and for National Independence asked the British
government to exert its influence to the Shanghai Municipal Council. It hoped that
the council could guarantee a fair trial in this case and assured the safety of these two
Europeans.353 The Howard League for Penal Reform and the Independent Labour
Party also approached the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary John Simon
concerning the treatment of Noulen in Chinese jail.354
Nevertheless, the British consular bodies were not sympathised towards
Noulens couple. They were afraid that British intervention in this case would be
utilised by communist presses to vilify the British imperial presence and to stir up
anti-British sentiments among the Chinese. The British consul in Shanghai J.F.
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Brenan explained why the British consulate in Shanghai did not give a helping hand
to Mr. Noulen and his wife.

… as they [the Shanghai Municipal Police] are conducting the
prosecution in a case in which the Chinese authorities are directly
interested, the British authorities are not in a position to intervene… if
we were to become a party to the arrangement proposed we may, in the
absence of any satisfactory guarantee to the contrary, find ourselves
accused, in the Soviet press and elsewhere, of an attempt to defeat the
ends of justice and making Chinese national interests subservient to our
own narrower interests.355
Sir Miles Lampson also showed his agreement and appreciation to Brenan who
might have prevented the British authorities from suffering another diplomatic
crisis.356
Without supports from the British diplomatic bodies, the attitude of the
Shanghai Municipal Police was changed concerning the extradition of Noulen couple.
After proving that Noulen and his wife were not nationals from any foreign powers,
the Shanghai Municipal Police agreed to hand over both of them to the Chinese
authorities on 12th August, 1931.357 The police advocate Mr. Kum, who used to
emphasise that Kiangsu High Court 2nd Branch should have the right to hear this case
of Noulens, completely changed his standpoint and gave his countenance to this
extradition order.

It is true that during the hearings, I maintained that the Kiangsu High
355
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Court, second branch, did have jurisdiction over the Noulens case, and
that the case should be tried here, but as Noulens’ criminal activities
extended to many provinces in China, other Chinese courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over the case also... A prima facie case against
the accused was established to the satisfaction of the Court and the
Council.358
Commissioner of Police F.W. Gerrard even refused to provide protections to
Noulen and his wife who resided in the Settlement for 1.5 year. He denied Noulen
Couple’s citizenship in the Settlement.359 Thus, the Shanghai Municipal Council was
forced to give up their insistence in defending the jurisdiction of the International
Settlement even though the crime was committed inside the Settlement. The British
authorities considered that the impact of anti-British sentiment would be far more
important than the judicial autonomy of the Settlement. Therefore, British expatriates
were again abandoned by British diplomats.
To conclude, the British informal presence in Shanghai survived at the expense of
the judicial independence of the Shanghai Municipal Council. Indeed, the Shanghai
Municipal Police still possessed the prosecution power in order to protect foreign
interests in the Settlement. Prosecutors appointed by the Chinese government could
not intervene in the cases which were handled by the municipal police.360 As Yao
Yuan suggests, the Settlement authorities would refuse to hand over some suspected
communists to China if the Kuomintang authorities failed to provide “sufficient”
358
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evidence.361 Ru Baoyi 汝葆彝, a former municipal advocate working for the
Shanghai Municipal Council, even pointed out that the settlement authorities could
reject any extradition request as they reserved the right to define whether the Chinese
authorities provided sufficient prima facie.362 Only by extraditing communists based
on adequate evidence could the Council retain its legal authority in the settlement.363
Given the massive amount of cases recorded in the Special Branch Files, it is true
that this chapter cannot completely examine how many extradition cases relating to
communist activities were rejected because of insufficient evidence.
Yet, what this research has shown is that the era representing absolute judicial
dominance of the Shanghai Municipal Council was gone. In the face of the fervid
Chinese nationalism, the Council first authorised its police force to hand over
suspects who were non-residents to the Chinese authorities without undergoing any
trials in 1928. Before the intervention of the British diplomatic bodies in late 1929,
the Shanghai Municipal Council could reject any extradition requests relating to
residents or cases in the Settlement, regardless of the sufficiency of evidence
provided by the Chinese authorities. However, the British Foreign Office not only
abolished the intervention of the consular deputies in the court, but it also warned the
council not to provide protections to their Chinese residents on suspicion of engaging
in any criminal activities in Chinese territory. Last but not least, the jurisdiction of
the Settlement was no longer protected by Britain as reflected in the case of Noulen
couple. Committing no crimes in China’s inland provinces, Noulen was wanted by
361
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the Kuomintang because he was of paramount importance to the Chinese Communist
Party. The extradition of these communists not only caused no harms to British
interests in Shanghai, but they could also alleviate the tense relationship between
Britain, the Shanghai International Settlement, the Kuomintang government and the
Chinese public. The extradition of communists shown in this chapter reveals that the
judicial neutrality and autonomy of the International Settlement was weakened. It
was because the council had to hand over communists to the Kuomintang which
would torture its political opponents in the future. It was apparent that the Shanghai
Municipal Council and its police force had become part of police networks of the
Nationalist government by the late 1920s. Therefore, I argue that British imperial
policies in Shanghai were readjusted at the expense of the judicial autonomy of the
International Settlement in the 1920s and 1930s.
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CHAPTER 5
REFORMATORIES
“We feel that the Regulations governing Houses of Reflection do not come with the category of good
laws. They also seem to be unfair, and to practically deprive Chinese citizens of the right of free
thought and speech.”364
R.J. Ryan (The Municipal Advocate)

The completion of arrest and extradition procedures doesn’t mean the end of the
story. Reformatories were another channel disclosing the cooperation between the
Shanghai Municipal Police and the Chinese authorities when handling political cases.
In fact, although the Chinese government captured many communists extradited by
the Settlement authorities, the “appetite” of the Nationalist government was still
voracious. Thus, in the 1930 decade, communist convicts who served or were serving
their sentences in the Ward Road Gaol became next targets wanted by Chinese
officials. But the ambition of the Chinese authorities to acquire communist prisoners
in the Ward Road Gaol would unquestionably undermine the neutrality of the
Shanghai International Settlement.
In fact, due to the lack of sources, there are just a few scholars studying detail of
reformatories in China. In the existing literature, only the research conducted by
Klaus Mühlhahn and Frank Dikötter can provide us with brief glances on the history
of reformatories during the republican era. Mühlhahn discusses reformatories in a
legal context. Criminal justice was closely connected with the development of
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Chinese society in terms of law codes, courts and penal system. Thus, the
assimilation of legal institutions in response to changing social circumstances was his
main focus. He argues that the reformatories were found in order to deal with the
consequences made in wars and revolutions.365 Focusing in a narrower sense,
Dikötter emphasises the evolution of Chinese penal systems from the Qing Dynasty
to the end of the republican era. In particular, he studies the significance of changing
cultural and social customs of prisons in modern China. With a view to repealing the
extraterritoriality, the establishment of reformatories and the restructure of prisons,
were reformative means employed by the Nanjing government to re-educate its
fellow countrymen who were always regarded as barbarous and uncivilised in the
eyes of westerners.366 However, neither Mühlhahn nor Dikötter discusses the case of
reformatories in the context of the Sino-British relations. They also did not mention
relocations of political prisoners from the Shanghai International Settlement to
Chinese reformatories. They neglect the fact that the Shanghai Municipal Council’s
recognition on Chinese reformatories was actually a trade-off between the survival of
the western economic dominance in China and the strengthening of the Nanjing
government.
This chapter not only discusses the loss of judicial autonomy of the municipal
police, but also depicts the decay of humanitarian ideas emphasised in the penal
system of the Settlement. Although there is no evidence showing Britain’s
intervention in the municipal council, the positive attitude of the British authorities
on the formation of Chinese reformatories should not be neglected. I argue that
sending political convicts imprisoned in the municipal gaol to Chinese reformatories
365
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in the 1930s shows readjustments of British imperial policies in China. It was
because the Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force could no longer uphold
its legal authority in the International Settlement.
Reformatories in republican China
According to Klaus Mühlhahn, Chinese criminal justice in the 1930s and 1940s
was severely infringed by consequences of wars and revolutions. Political
departments not only overrode judicial institutions but also intervened in legal
procedures. Military and secret services began to imprison political offenders in
different detention centres, bypassing formal legal procedures.367 Indeed, after the
success of the northern expedition in 1928, the Kuomintang not only attempted to
eliminate communists militarily, but it also tried to transform thoughts of captured
communists. There was no doubt that correcting social misbehaviour of convicts was
one of aims for setting up reformatories.368 However, transforming ideas possessed
by political prisoners was more important for reformatory staff.369 Subsequently, the
Regulation Governing Reformatory 反省院條例 was promulgated by the Chinese
government on 2nd December, 1929.370 The Chinese authorities regarded the
following “anti-revolutionaries” had to be imprisoned in reformatories.
1. Those completed half of their sentence for the crime of
“Anti-revolution” and felt repented.
2. Those finished their sentence but did not feel regret for
their faults against the 1911 revolution.
3. Those were imprisoned by the Court under one year’s
367
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sentence concerning the crime of “Anti-revolution”.
4. Those were subject to the regulations for repenting
communists, article no. 8
5. Those sentenced by Nationalist Party Headquarters371
A sentence for each term was six months. The maximum confinement period was
five years. Prior to the end of each term, prisoners would be assessed by the Board
of Review. The Board, which was composed of Nationalist party representatives
(The word “Tangpu” 黨部 was used by the municipal council to describe party
representatives of the Nationalist Party. “Tangpu” will be used hereafter), judges of
the High Court and presidents of reformatories, reserved the rights to decide
whether a prisoner should be released based on his / her reforming progress.372 No
matter political convicts repented or not, it was possible for them to transfer from
detention centres or prisons to reformatories where political indoctrination was
provided. More importantly, judging in accordance with their own logic and
preference, the Nationalist Party reserved final rights to decide who should be sent
to the reformatories and lengths of the confinement period. Although the
reformatories were theoretically controlled by judicial institutions, party
headquarters and military agents were the main authorities operating these
reformatories.373
Since the late 1920s, the Nationalist government had set up plenty of
reformatories throughout the country. Including the Metropolitan Reformatory in
Nanjing established in March 1937, there were at least twelve reformatories built in
different provincial capitals controlled by the Chinese government.374 Scales of
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reformatories varied and depended on actual conditions of different locations. A
reformatory in a city like Suzhou 蘇州, for example, was very small. There was
only 259 prisoners who were divided into six groups in 1935.375 Locating near the
headquarter of the Chinese Communist Party in the Jiangxi province 江西省, the
Kiukiang reformatory 九江反省院 kept about 13,000 ex-communists in January
1935.376 The establishment of reformatories in different provinces could disclose
the determination of the Nationalist Party to suppress communism in China by
transforming thoughts of ex-communists.
Apart from providing vocational training similar to what other prisons provided,
Chinese reformatories mainly implanted pro-Kuomintang political beliefs to their
prisoners. The Three Principles of the People 三民主義, civic education, evils of
communism, and national history were subjects taught in reformatories.377 It was
mandatory for prisoners to attend lectures and seminars provided by reformatory
instructors. Clearly, the Nationalist Party was keen on completely removing
communist ideas kept by political offenders. Its next targets were communist
convicts imprisoned in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol managed by the Shanghai
Municipal Police.
Dilemma of the Shanghai Municipal Council
In Chinese controlled territory in Shanghai, the local party branch followed the
orders of the Nationalist Party not only by accepting surrenders of communists, but
also by reforming them in different prisons. Composed of party, military and judicial
reformatories for incarcerating political prisoners. See “Nanking Political Prisoners Now Housed in
New Home”, the Shanghai Times, 1st March, 1937 in “Reforming of Political Offenders. Regulations
Governing the surrender of communists, ref. D4797, Shanghai Municipal Police Investigation Files,
1894-1944
375
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representatives, the “Surrendered communists investigation committee” 上海市共黨
自首案件審查委員會 and the “Shanghai Committee to Examine Cases of
Surrendered Communists” were formed to process surrender applications of
ex-communists in Shanghai in September and in November 1934 respectively.378
Acting in accordance with the Regulations Governing Reformatory,379 the above
authorities would examine repentant communists carefully in a case by case basis.
Six months after their establishment, these authorities received 120 applications.
After approved by the Kuomintang, ex-communists would be sent to reformatories.
Upon the completion of their sentences, communist convicts would receive
certificates proving their repentance to join the Communist Party.380
In addition, the Nationalist Party in Shanghai also engaged in educational missions.
In May 1936, the Committee for re-educating political prisoners in Shanghai 上海政
治犯教誨委員會 was established to re-educate communist convicts imprisoned in
different prisons controlled by the Chinese authorities in Shanghai.381 Members of
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this committee visited Chinese prisons and gave lectures to communist convicts
about the Three Principles of the People. By doing so, they hoped they could
remould the thoughts of political offenders”.382
In short, the Nationalist Party in Shanghai faithfully followed instructions of the
Nanjing government. It attempted to transform the thoughts of political offenders.
Communist convicts incarcerated in the municipal were also affected by this policy
promulgated by the Nanjing Government.
Political prisoners including communist convicts in the Settlement were
imprisoned in the Ward Road Gaol in the 1920s and the 1930s. The Gaol branch of
the Shanghai Municipal Police was responsible for the management of all prisons
controlled by the Shanghai Municipal Council. In 1931, there were approximately
486 wardens to supervise 7552 prisoners in the Ward Road Gaol and Amoy Road.383
Among these prisoners, only a small number of them were categorised as political
prisoners. According to the record of a French police report, there were 243 political
offenders incarnated in Chinese prisons and gaols of the two foreign concessions in
1936, 42 of which were imprisoned inside the Ward Road Gaol of the International
Settlement.384
Subsequently, the Settlement court requested the Shanghai Municipal Council to
representatives like Tung Ying Pai (童行白) and officials of local educational bureau like Chiang
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hand over the “anti-revolutionary” political prisoners in accordance with section two,
article five of the Reformatory regulation.385 These prisoners were almost released
on expiry of their terms of sentence and failed to show any repentance.386 Indeed, it
was very unusual that prisoners completing their terms of imprisonment had to be
confined again in other penal institutions. Nevertheless, the Nationalist Party insisted
that imprisoning these convicts in reformatories was necessary. Fearing the rising
influence of communist prisoners after finishing their sentence, the Chinese
authorities wanted to purify the thoughts of these political convicts before their
release.387 Thus, from the Chinese government’s perspective, sending these convicts
to reformatories was for the sake of its national security.
Yet, the council’s response was very negative at the beginning. In his reply to the
acting municipal advocate and the Commissioner of Police, J. R. Jones, the secretary
of the council, strongly rejected the request of the Chinese authorities.

It is obvious that the Council cannot dispose of prisoners except
according to the sentence of the court…The Council cannot give
instructions in accordance with the [2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court]
President’s request.388
Undoubtedly, the council was in a dilemma for handing over its political prisoners
in the Settlement. Indeed, the judicial autonomy of the Settlement would have been
385
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infringed if the council made this promise for China. But if the council refused to
make a concession, it would have faced the diplomatic pressure from the Chinese
government.
Nevertheless, no reformatories were particularly established for remoulding
peoples’ thoughts in the penal system of the Settlement at that time. The Ward Road
Gaol and the Amoy Road Gaol were the only two prisons incarnating adult convicts
in the Settlement. Although there was a reformatory administered by the municipal
police, it was only used to imprison juvenile males and was not run along the line of
Chinese reformatories.389 So, the council could not dispose of communist convicts to
reformatories in Chinese territory which were not a part of penal institutions in the
Settlement.
More importantly, J. R. Jones strongly emphasised the significance of the legal
autonomy in the Settlement. He explained to the Commissioner of Police about the
impossibility to satisfy Chinese demand by saying that “it is obviously wrong for the
Council to hand over a prisoner upon his release for examination by Tangpu or
anyone else…”390 Traditionally, the legal authority of the Court was supreme and
independent when the International Settlement was established. Before the
disbandment of the Mixed Court in 1927, the jurisdiction of the Court was
implemented according to the rules of 1869.391 The Sub-prefect was entitled to
adjudicate all civil and criminal cases involving Chinese subjects. He had the right to
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examine, to detain and even to punish Chinese convicts.392 Although Chinese Court
had replaced the Mixed Court by the early 1930s, the council still denied that the
judgment of a Sub-Prefect could be interfered and dominated by representatives of
the Nationalist Party. Even though the court could summon witnesses and experts,393
Tangpu could hardly be distinguished as either one of them. It was because personal
mentalities were subjective and private. Therefore, the Kuomintang’s request on
sending communist convicts in the Settlement to Chinese reformatory was rejected
by the council which attempted to defend the legal independence of the Settlement.
However, it seems that the British government was unsympathetic about handing
over communist prisoners to Chinese reformatories. In the early 1930s, the British
Foreign Office was well informed about the news concerning the establishment of
reformatories in China. The British Consul General in Nanjing, for example, notified
the British Minister to China Alexander Cadogan that more than 13,000 red bandits,
who received military, vocational, and ideological training, were “converting into
loyal Chinese citizens” in the Jiujiang reformatory in November 1933.394 After
finishing his visit in Southern China in September 1935, a British military attaché
called Lieutenant Colonel Lovat Fraser wrote a report concerning the intelligence of
the Chinese civil war to the British Embassy in Beijing. In his first sentence of
comments about the reformatory, he heavily criticised communists for bringing
“appalling economic conditions” in China to “a very great extent”.395 British
investments in China were inevitably disturbed by these communists who agitated
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thousands of strikes, demonstrations and riots in different treaty ports. Communists
were thus enemies of the British and the Chinese governments. Perhaps, the
mentality of the British authorities towards reformatories can be realised by
analysing the opinion of Fraser on the Jiujiang reformatory.
This Reformatory is undoubtedly doing good work, but the class of
people with which it has to deal makes progress extremely slow and
problematical. The ultimate success of the undertaking will rest in the
hands of the Provincial officials, and the treatment that they made out to
the prisoners on their return to their home.396
Clearly, this British Officer fully recognised and supported the Nationalist party’s
transformation works on communist prisoner of wars. His report implied that British
officers agreed with Jiang Jieshi’s actions in suppressing communism in the Republic
of China. Fraser further pointed out that the accomplishment of this project relied on
capabilities of local officials in reformatories. Therefore, communist disturbances on
British investments in China could explain why the British authorities did not
interfere in the treatments of communist prisoners in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol
and in the Soochow reformatory.
Diplomatically, the British government had already limited the penal power of the
International settlement since the signing of the second rendition agreement in 1930.
According to Article VII of the agreement:
All prisoners now serving sentences in the prisons attached to the
Chinese court now functioning in the International Settlement and those
sentenced by the Courts established under the present agreement shall
serve their sentences either in such prisons in the Settlement or in
Chinese prisons outside the Settlement… The prisons in the Settlement
shall be operated, as far as practicable, in conformity with Chinese
396
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prison regulations and shall be subject to inspection by officers
appointed by the Chinese judicial authorities.397
With the approval from the British Foreign Office, jails in the Settlement had been
amalgamated to the Chinese penal system since 1930. Chinese prisoners were even
allowed to finish their sentences either in the municipal gaol or in Chinese prisons.
Tsu Kyi Sing, a prisoner incarcerated in the Settlement, requested successfully to
complete the rest of his sentence in the Jiangsu No.2 prison in Chinese territory
during the early 1930s.398 Although Frank Dikötter argues that some Chinese prison
regulations in the Settlement were not practically and strictly enforced, he ignores the
fact that the Settlement faithfully practiced the Regulations for Governing
Reformatories in the Settlement.
Thus, the Shanghai Municipal Gaol in the Settlement began to connect with
Chinese reformatories in the early 1930s. As the department which was responsible
to imprison political convicts, the Shanghai Municipal Police concurred with the
implementation of the Regulations of Governing Reformatories in the Municipal
Gaol. According to Extra-Commissioner of Police R. M. J. Martin, there would be
“no objection offered by this department (Gaol branch) to the President’s
proposal”.399 The acting municipal advocate King S. Kum not only recognised the
standpoint of the municipal police, but he also suggested that “I can see no objection
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to the Court’s sending offenders to the reformatory at Soochow”.400 He fully agreed
that once political convicts in the municipal gaol were due for release, they should be
examined in the Court. If the Court believed that these convicts were not truly
repented, they would be sent to the Soochow reformatory.401 Mr. Kum even
persuaded the council secretary who thought China’s request was unreasonable to
carry out the instructions stated in the Rendition Agreement.
… the Regulations Governing Reformatories are applicable to the
Chinese Courts in the Settlement by virtue of the Rendition Agreement.
Since there is no such form of Reformatory in the Settlement, the Court
by virtue of Article VII of the Rendition Agreement, has power to order
a prisoner to serve his sentence outside of the Settlement.402
Therefore, the independence of the penal system of the Settlement was infringed by
the Chinese authorities.
With regard to the judicial autonomy of the Court, Mr. Kum did not think that the
involvement of Kuomintang representatives in legal proceedings was an
infringement. He only regarded these Tangpu members as “experts conducting an
investigation for the Court.” The final power to dispose of the prisoner, in his opinion,
is vested in the Court.403 Another municipal advocate R. J. Ryan also emphasised
that reformatory regulations did not violate the Land Regulations and by laws
because Tangpu members only provided testimonies and consultations for judges
without interfering judgments of the Court.404 Nevertheless, it was undeniable that
opinions of Tangpu members were actually decisive and significant to affect the
400
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thoughts of magistrates. Even Mr. Kum admitted that “it is practically impossible for
gaol staff to make any observation as to whether a political prisoner is liable to
commit such an offense (communism) again after he is released.”405 Thus, law
enforcement officers in the Settlement had no objective ways to distinguish the
mentalities of political prisoners. Even though judgments were theoretically decided
by the Court, the role of Tangpu members was still very important to influence
judges. The neutrality and the judicial autonomy of the Court in the Settlement were
therefore damaged by the Chinese government.
The destination was Soochow
As a result, the Municipal Gaol began to hand over different communist prisoners
to the Chinese Reformatory in Soochow in early 1933.406 Non-repented political
offenders who were due for release were urgently wanted by the Nationalist Party. In
fact, prisons under Chinese administration in Shanghai also invited Tangpu to
evaluate the mentalities of their prisoners when they were due for release.407 Zhang
Junhua 張俊華 and Zhao Yinghua 趙映華, who were political offenders
imprisoned in the Shanghai Jiangsu High Court No.2 Prison, were classified as
“repentant” and were released after examined by Tangpu.408 Similarly, as one of
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components of the Chinese penal system, the Ward Road Gaol in the International
Settlement also invited Tangpu to examine its communist prisoners before their
releases. According to a study of the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, at least
four communist convicts were transferred from the municipal gaol to the Soochow
reformatory due to their insistence on their communist convictions.409
Cao Diqiu 曹荻秋, who was a communist prisoner in the municipal gaol and later
the mayor of Shanghai after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, was
an example showing how the Regulation for Governing Chinese Reformatory
worked in the Settlement during the 1930s. He was arrested on 17th March, 1932 by
the municipal police during a raid in a communist base located at 385 Changping
Road and 370 Changping Road.410 A large quantity of stamps, documents and
communist literature such as pamphlets commemorating the anniversary of the Paris
Commune were discovered in this base. Bearing the charge of propagating
communism, Cao and his two comrades were later sentenced to five-year
imprisonments in the municipal gaol by the Kiangsu High Court.411 Prior to the
completion of his sentence in April 1937, Cao was firstly transferred from the
municipal gaol to a detention centre of the Chinese Court in the Settlement. Then, an
agent was sent from the Kuomintang to examine his thought. Comments of the
Chinese authority on Cao after an interview were as follows:
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His attitude was fair; however, he refused to confess his faults committed
in the past. He did not have any expressions after our persuasion.
At last, he just promised not to engage in political activities.412

When writing a biography for her husband, Cao’s wife Shi Bin 石斌, showed her
compliment to Cao, praising his loyalty towards the Communist Party.
After finishing his five-year sentence, Diqiu did not think that he
committed any crimes. He then united all communist convicts to
struggle with his enemies after the Kuomintang imprisoned him again in
the Soochow reformatory.413
Eventually, due to his insistence on his communist faith, Cao was
handed over from the Settlement Gaol to the Soochow reformatory on 26th April,
1937. Clearly, the Nationalist Party took an important role in affecting the judgment
of the Court in this case. This incident also shows that the municipal police faithfully
executed the decision made by Tangpu members.
Another person spotted by the Chinese authorities was Zhou Lipo 周立波 who
was a proof-reader in a factory.414 Later, He was also a famous leftist writer in the
People’s Republic of China. Posting anti-government handbills outside the Universal
Printing Shop at No. 650 Sinza Road, Zhou was arrested by the municipal police on
6th February, 1932. Plenty of communist literature was also discovered by detectives
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in his premise.415 On 25th April 1932, Zhou was prosecuted by the Settlement
authorities with the charge of “propagating communism”. He was eventually
sentenced to the municipal gaol for two years and six months. A one-year deduction
of sentence was granted to Zhou during an amnesty afterwards.416 Prior to his
release in December, 1933, the municipal gaol invited Tangpu members to examine
Zhou about his thoughts. Facing strong persuasion from Tangpu, Zhou Lipo still
firmly refused to confess to Chinese officers concerning his former involvements in
communist activities.417 He was then sent to the Soochow Reformatory for another
seven months’ imprisonment.
As the Special Branch files show, Zhang Yunqing 張雲卿 was apprehended
because of his membership of the Left Wing Cultural League 中國左翼作家聯盟 on
17th March, 1932. He was inspected by Tangpu members in the 2nd Branch Kiangsu
High Court in 1937.418 After being incarcerated in the Shanghai Municipal Gaol for
five years, Zhang was classified by Kuomintang representatives as a non-repented
person. In April 1937, judges of the Shanghai Special District Court and the
Shanghai Municipal Police were informed by the Kuomintang that Zhang had to be
sent to the Soochow Reformatory for re-education.419 In short, the implementation
of reformatory regulations was an infringement on the penal system in the Settlement.
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More importantly, Tangpu members’ influence over judgments of the Court
inevitably destroyed the judicial autonomy of the International Settlement.
Apart from transferring non-repented communist convicts, the council also
assisted the Chinese authorities to transfer repentant political offenders to the
Soochow Reformatory. According to the Regulations for Governing the Reformatory,
any repentant political convicts who had served half of their sentences (later one
third was also accepted), were welcome to continue their sentences in Chinese
reformatories.420 Indeed, prisons in Chinese territory had already implemented this
law code after its promulgation. Zhou Jinhai 周金海, who finished one third of his
sentence in the No.2 Prison in Shanghai, was applauded by Chinese wardens as kind
and repentant. He was then recommended by the prison to continue his sentence in
the Soochow reformatory in February 1936.421
Again, the Shanghai Municipal Council, which was tied by the rendition
agreement, also implemented reformatory regulations in Settlement jails. Working in
line with Chinese regulations, wardens of the municipal gaol encouraged political
prisoners to move to the Soochow reformatory. Xu Jianlou 徐建樓, who had been
incarcerated in the Ward Road Gaol for more than one year in spring 1937, depicted
how wardens worked side by side with the Chinese government.
The Gaol authority announced a decision made by the Nationalist
Party to us. Any political convicts, who had served half or one third of
420
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their sentences, were eligible to continue their sentences in Chinese
reformatories.422

Ultimately, three to four communists submitted their applications to the municipal
gaol.423
Again, Tangpu interfered in the administration of the municipal gaol as they had
the power to decide which convicts were repentant. All prisoners who applied for
relocation in Chinese reformatories must be examined by Tangpu. Only confessed
prisoners would be sent to the reformatory. Liu Jun 劉俊, who was a political
prisoner in the Ward Road Gaol in 1936, could prove about this issue.424
Undoubtedly, such practice would attract attentions of communist prisoners. It was
because they would be released after six months’ imprisonments in a reformatory. It
was really good news for some of these communist convicts who felt desperate after
being imprisoned for a long time. Yao Jianai 姚家礽, who wrote slogans on walls
and distributed plenty of communist literature at the Yulin road in November 1935,
was sentenced to a three-year imprisonment in the Ward Road Gaol.425 According to
Yao, a deputy governor of the gaol and some wardens announced to political
prisoners in spring 1937 that if they were willing to go to Chinese reformatories, they
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would be released earlier than they expected.426 Eventually, although the majority of
prisoners ignored these officers, two communists still wanted to move to Chinese
reformatories.427
Zhang Zongshun 張宗順, who was also a member of the Left Wing Cultural
League, adopted a totally different attitude compared with his comrade Zhang
Yunqing mentioned earlier. Showing his confession to the Kuomintang authority, he
made a personal request that he was willing to receive re-education in a Chinese
reformatory.428
Apart from relocating its own prisoners to Chinese reformatories, the Shanghai
Municipal Police also provided escorts for transferring political offenders from other
Chinese prisons in the Settlement to the Shanghai railway station. These offenders
would be sent to the Soochow reformatory based on requests made by the Chinese
authorities. The Chinese No. 2 Prison recommended Lin Ziming 林子明, Chen
Cihang 陳慈航 and Zhuming 朱明 to continue their sentences in Chinese
reformatories outside the Settlement in July 1935.429 This was because these three
prisoners were willing to confess all their “sins”. Relocating these prisoners from
Shanghai to Soochow definitely required the assistance from the Settlement
426
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authorities in Shanghai. Inevitably, Chinese wardens and these three prisoners
needed to pass through the Foreign Concessions, the International Settlement and the
Zhapei area controlled by the Chinese government. Before the relocation took place,
the Chinese No.2 prison contacted the Shanghai Municipal Police for escorting these
prisoners.
On 3rd August at 8am, we will escort Messrs. Lin Zimu to the Soochow
Reformatory. Before that, a police wagon is going to pass through
Boulevard de Montigny (敏體尼蔭路, located in French Concession) and
Xizang Road (西藏路, located in the International Settlement), before
getting on a train at the Zhabei Railway Station. Please asked your police
officers to allow us to pass through the Settlement and provided any
assistance to them if needed.430
Subsequently, not only did the French Concession Police borrow a police wagon for
transporting these wardens and prisoners, but the Shanghai Municipal Police and the
Public Safety Bureau also provided escorts to these Chinese personnel to pass
through the International Settlement and Chinese territory.431
In short, the Shanghai Municipal Gaol became a part of the penal system of the
Chinese government. The interference of Tangpu members and the collaboration of
wardens in the Ward Road Gaol revealed the weakened judicial power of the
Shanghai Municipal Council and its police force. It was because they lost their rights
to release their political prisoners incarcerated in the Settlement. Moreover, the
municipal police even helped to escort convicts of Chinese prisons to the railway
station when they were on their way to the Soochow Reformatory. Therefore, the
430
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municipal police and its prison were under the control of the Chinese authorities to a
large extent. Legal autonomy in the Settlement was severely infringed.
Degeneracy of humanitarian treatment
Civilising the Chinese was one of the missions behind the theory of the White
Men’s burden when the British started to rule over their colonial subjects.432 The
penitentiary institution was an example illustrating the magnificence of the British
civilisation.433 A British Mixed Court Assessor even bragged the Council’s
administration on prisons was “in the interests of civilisation so that China might
learn that punishment can be effectual without the employment of barbarous methods
which are in vogue throughout the Empire.”434
Indeed, perspectives on western penal systems had experienced drastic changes
since the late 18th century. Due to humanitarian ideas proposed by Enlightenment
philosophers, prisoners were regarded as components of a society. Therefore, they
deserved humane treatments in prisons. Subsequently, reforming penal systems in
different countries symbolised a sense of modernity to wipe out savageness and
backwardness.435 As William Forsythe observes, the drastic change of British penal
system in the 19th century was attributed to the contribution of the evangelicals and
the associationists. Both of them agreed that there should be alternatives to rectify
faults made by prisoners other than physical punishments. The evangelicals
emphasised that “the value of every human being” should be in line with God’s
commandments whereas the associationists suggested providing rewards and
encouragements to prisoners.436 As a result, the management of penitentiaries in the
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United Kingdom had already undergone tremendous reforms and modifications since
the 19th century. Likewise, British expatriates were committed to enlighten the
Chinese by reforming the penitentiary in different British concessions.
Since the British occupied China in the mid-19th century, a series of “China Ports
Prison Regulations” had become effective in different treaty ports and British
territories in China. The Ward Road Gaol, which was located in the Shanghai
International Settlement influenced by British settlers, abided by the “Shanghai
Prison Regulation” drafted by the British Foreign Office. All British prisoners
benefited from this prison regulation.437 Even though Chinese prisoners were not
under the protection of this regulation, a British pressure group in the 1930s also
showed its concern on the treatment of Chinese prisoners in the municipal gaol. After
inspecting the Ward Road Gaol, Miss Margery Fry, who was the secretary of the
Howard League for Penal Reform, wrote a long evaluation report to the British
Foreign Office criticising the management of the municipal gaol when incarcerating
Chinese prisoners. Miss Fry was concerned about the physical and mental conditions
of the Chinese in the municipal gaol.438 The Howard League for Penal Reform,
which was a London-based pressure group, demanded the British government to
reform penal systems and to modify criminal codes. In accordance with Andrew
Thompson, pressure groups in Britain were influential to affect imperial policies of
the British government.439 Sharing similar language and culture, British citizens at
437
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home had the same Britishness and close connections with British settlers overseas.
Therefore, the British at home had initiatives to involve in the decision-making
process of imperial policies. Thus, Miss Fry’s comments could pressure the British
Foreign Office and the Shanghai Municipal Council to improve the administration of
prisons in the International Settlement.
Although sometimes conditions were disgusting in the Ward Road gaol,, the
municipal council still provided humanitarian services to prisoners physically and
spiritually. When lots of prisoners suffered from serious diseases, the Commission of
Public Health suggested building a prison hospital to cure patients in the gaol.440
While some medical officers attributed the cause of health problems in the prison to
the insufficiency of food and nutrients, the council was then advised to provide maize,
sorghum and even cod-liver oil in the diets of prisoners.441
More importantly, the ideas and thoughts of prisoners in the Settlement were well
respected. Even though the council prepared educational trainings for the juvenile
males incarcerated in the municipal reformatory, these youngsters could still decide
whether to join or not. Whilst responding to Miss Margery Fry’s criticisms, the
chairman of the council Harry Arnold even considered to employ specially-trained
teachers and to widen curricula assisted by the Education department.442 Thus, not
only were the wills of prisoners respected, but syllabi were also diverse and broad.
Reading was also permitted with little restrictions. According to the Shanghai
Prison Regulations, British prisoners not only could read books prepared by the
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Council in the gaol library, but they were also allowed to request somebody to buy
different literature such as books and newspapers for them to read in prisons. Apart
from religious and language works such as the Bible and Anglo-Chinese dictionaries,
political offenders in the municipal gaol were even allowed to read political,
philosophical and socialist literature.

…We asked the Gaol authority to buy some books for us. Most of the
books we wanted were the masterpieces of Marxism, such as
the Anti-Dühring, the Critique of the Gotha programme, the Dialectical
materialism, Shen Zhiyuan 沈志遠’s political economy, Li Da
李達’sMaterialist Dialectics, Ai Siqi 艾思奇’s Public Philosophy.
The warden who bought these books for us was ignorant of these books.
He just thought these works were relevant to history, economic studies and
philosophy. When everybody in the prison saw these “spiritual food”,
they not only felt excited, but also decided to study hard.443

According to Liu Jun, communist convicts were also allowed to form study groups to
learn political, cultural and Chinese revolutionary theories. Some communists even
gave lectures on sensitive topics such as “The nature and missions of Chinese
revolutions”, “Political economy” and “Materialist Dialectics”.444 Political
interventions on the thoughts of prisoners were minimal. Undoubtedly, criminals in
the Settlement were deprived of their personal freedoms due to their violations on the
law and order. Yet, their dignities and self-esteems were well-respected in the
Shanghai Municipal Gaol.
Ironically, the Shanghai Municipal Council which was largely influenced by
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western penal reforms had to send its communist prisoners to the Soochow
Reformatory where inhumane treatments were found. [Please refer to appendix 12]
In fact, even the municipal advocate R.J. Ryan also expressed his disagreement and
denial in handing over prisoners to a Chinese reformatory.
We feel that the Regulations governing Houses of Reflection
(the establishment of reformatories) do not come with the category of good
laws. They also seem to be unfair, and to practically deprive Chinese
citizens of the right of free thought and speech.445

Paradoxically, some prisoners in the Soochow reformatory praised and thanked for
the efforts of their instructors for freeing themselves from the communist
“contamination”. A prisoner claimed himself became healthier because “the training
in this reformatory made him feel relaxed, pleased and gratified”.446 He further
pointed out that the Soochow reformatory enabled him to discover his absolute faith
and to foresee a brighter future.447
Indeed, the above narratives were only an incomplete picture of the story. Behind
the scenes, prisoners in the Soochow reformatory experienced lots of inhumane
treatments which could hardly be found in the municipal gaol. Memoirs of prisoner
and annual reports of some Chinese reformatories can justify that there were no
exaggerations for Mr. Ryan’s statement in describing the negative nature of the
Regulations Governing Chinese reformatory.
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Similar to the municipal gaol, Chinese reformatories also provided prisoners with
education opportunities. However, not only were their lectures mandatory, but
curriculum of these lectures had an implication to remould the political ideologies of
prisoners. In the Soochow reformatory, prisoners would be requested to attend
different lectures based on their educational levels. The reformatory offered eleven
courses across a wide range of disciplines such as craftsmanship, commence,
physical education. Five of which such as “Doctrine of Dr. Sun”, “Three Principles
of the People”, “political science”, “framework for establishing the state” and
“Military lecture” were related to politics.448 Sharing similar curriculum content, the
Shanxi reformatory 山西反省院 could give us a glance at objectives of their
lectures in its annual report. Apart from teaching prisoners basic vocational and
technical skills, instructors of the reformatory attempted to implant the ideologies of
the Kuomintang to political offenders. “The evil of communism”, “reverence for Dr.
Sun Yat Sin”, “the goal of the Chinese revolution” and “the circumstance of the
international relations” were lecture topics favouring the perspective of the
Kuomintang.449 Six out of twenty-one hours per week were spent to teach the above
ideas in the reformatory in 1933.450 One of the convicts incarcerated in the Soochow
Reformatory even depicted the lesson about “Three Principles of the People” as a
course teaching people to become “obedient and loyal slaves”.451 As a consequence,
political offenders had no alternative ways to express their political ideas. They had
448

Xu Jingzong 徐景宗, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan 江蘇反省院 (Soochow Reformatory) in Liangyou
《良友》 The companion pictorial, No.102 (Shanghai: Liangyou Tushu Gongsi 良友圖書公司
Companion publisher company limited , 1935), 11-13
449
Shanxi Fanxingyuan Gaikuang 《山西反省院概況》 (Overview of the Shanxi Reformatory)
(Shanxi: Shanxi Fanxingyuan 山西反省院 Shanxi Reformatory, 1933), 12-13
450
Ibid, 12-13
451
Lin Lan 林嵐, Yige Baogui de Jiaoxun Fanxingyuan de Shenghuo Saomiao 一個寶貴的教訓"反
省院"的生活素描 A valuable lesson: the portrait of the life inside the reformatory (Soochow) in
Shelian Mengbao 《社聯盟報》Newspaper of social union, No. 26-27, ref.: D2-0-2020-32 (Shanghai:
unpublished documents stored in the Shanghai Municipal Archive, 1935), 33
137

to accept the ideas written in the “Three Principles of the People”.
Teaching materials were also carefully selected in different courses. Due to the
political natures of the courses, reformatory staff used Kuomintang official’s written
works as their textbooks. “The Three Principles of People” 三民主義 and the
“National Reconstruction” 建國方略 written by Dr. Sun Zhongshan was the main
references for prisoners to study in the lesson about party ideology.452 Moreover,
correspondences written between the Nationalist government, the Kuomintang Party
and different provincial government departments were even selected as the main
references in Chinese language classes of the Shanxi reformatory.453 Also, although
reformatories provided different kinds of magazines and books for prisoners to read,
literature about Kuomintang ideologies formed the majority of books in the
library.454 Thus, prisoners were subject to political assimilation in reformatories
because they could only read literature published by the Kuomintang.
As the main ideology upheld by the Kuomintang and the Nationalist government,
the Three Principles of the People was drafted during the 1911 revolution. It was the
first slogans advocated by anti-Qing revolutionaries and later it became the
fundamental “creed” of the Kuomintang. There were three components inside this
political doctrine. Nationalism (民族 Minzu) meant Chinese people, including other
ethnic minorities, should be free from foreign interference. Secondly, citizens in
China deserved democracy (民權 Miquan) to exert their influence in public policies
of their own country. Lastly, “people’s livelihood” (民生 Minsheng) represented the
idea of equalisation of land ownership based on a fair taxation system.455 The above
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doctrines indicated that the Three Principles of the People was not necessarily
anti-communist. Dr. Sun Zhongshan even allied with the Chinese Communist Party
to fight against warlords in the early 1920s. It was Jiang Jieshi who added his
personal anti-communist sentiment into the Three Principles of the People in order to
accomplish his plan to eliminate communist activities.
Not only did the syllabi and the reading materials of the lectures imply political
meanings, but the themes of the extra-curricular activities were also problematic.
Apart from regular lectures, different reformatories also organised debates,
symposiums and seminars.456 Most of the topics for these activities were politically
oriented. For example, the debate topics in the Shanxi Reformatory in 1933 included
“Freedom of thought”, “Students should not interfere in politics” and “the urgent
need for China to promulgate a constitution”. Preconceptions favouring the rule of
the Nationalist Party were also disclosed in subjects of different symposiums.
Prisoners not only discussed the ways to unify China and to accomplish party rule,
but they also needed to talk about the reasons for the inapplicability of class struggle
in China.457 Thus, the Chinese authorities intentionally designed pro-Kuomintang
curriculum for their students in reformatories. By remoulding the thoughts of
prisoners, Chinese reformatories attempted to remove their anti-government
sentiments towards the Kuomintang.
Subsequently, assessments followed afterwards. Apart from taking monthly tests
and quizzes,458 prisoners were also required to submit homework regularly
concerning political issues. Prior to exam periods, prisoners had to submit articles
showing how they felt repentant about their previous involvements in communist
456
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activities. The Shanxi reformatory also asked their prisoners to write book reviews
based on written works published by the Kuomintang authorities.459 According to
the minute of the education committee in 1933, political offenders were required to
write book reviews on “A brief history of Premier Sun” 總理傳略, “The Military
ethics of soldiers” 軍人精神教育 and “The provisional constitution of the Republic
of China” 中華民國臨時訓政約法.460 Yuan Yelie 袁也烈, who was once a
political prisoner in a reformatory, still remembered “The Philosophy of Life” 唯生
論 written by a famous Kuomintang member Chen Lifu 陳立夫 was also inside the
list of the assigned literature in the Soochow Reformatory.461 The prisoners were
given one month only to finish writing their reviews. Instructors would mark and
comment on their works at the end of each month.462
Moreover, individual interviews were also held to examine prisoners. Meeting
prisoners in person, reformatory staff would observe the behaviours of their prisoners.
Proper “guidance” would be given to prisoners if their thoughts failed to match with
the standard of the Nationalist government.463 Clandestinely, some prisoners even
worked as collaborators of reformatories behind the scenes. These collaborators
acquired the intelligence from other prisoners. Reformatory instructors were
therefore well-informed about the mentalities and the political points of view of
different prisoners. They could even know whether a prisoner was truly repented.464
By experiencing the above assessments, political prisoners were trained to
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Ibid, 15. Also see Lin Lan, 一個寶貴的教訓"反省院"的生活素描 in《社聯盟報》,No. 26-27, ref.:
D2-0-2020-32, 33
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140
460

abandon their own idea and thoughts. They were forced by reformatories to
recognise the legitimacy of the Kuomintang to rule over China. These communist
prisoners were deprived of their rights to think, to analyse and to express. After the
completion of their sentences in reformatories, there were no guarantees that they
would be released. Communists would only be set free when reformatory instructors
believed that they were truly repented. Indeed, only very few people could leave
reformatories after they finished their sentence. A witness in the Soochow
reformatory even described that being incarnated in the reformatory was actually a
kind of “life imprisonment”.465 The power to discharge political offenders was
solely rested on the reformatory instructors. Whether these communists truly
repented or not, they all experienced different levels of mental tortures during their
detentions in Chinese reformatories. It was indeed ironic that the Shanghai Municipal
Council and its police force, which adopted western humanitarian treatments in their
prisons, allowed their communist prisoners to endure spiritual exploitations in
Chinese reformatories.
Although the municipal advocate Mr. Ryan was sympathetic to the communist
prisoners incarcerated in the Soochow reformatory, he still urged the Shanghai
Municipal Council to implement the rendition agreement accordingly. He thought
that the Chinese authorities would only have been satisfied if the council was willing
to implement reformatory regulations in the settlement.
They are Chinese law, however, as such should be enforced in the
Settlement. If the council should refuse to cooperate with the Court to
the extent above outline, we feel that it would be impinging upon the
Rendition Agreement. You will agree, we believe, the Council should do
its utmost to uphold the agreement so that it can more easily persuade
465

Ibid, 33
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the Chinese to carry out their part of its provisions.466
Eventually, most of the communist prisoners in Chinese reformatories were not
released until a compromise was made between the Nationalist Party and the
Communist Party during the outbreak of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in August 1937.
This was because both parties recognised the need to concentrate their resources to
fight against the Japanese in China.467
To conclude, the British imperial presence in Shanghai during the 1930s suffered a
significant setback. First of all, the judicial independence and neutrality of the
Settlement were infringed again because the municipal gaol became a part of the
Chinese penal system. Inside the Settlement, there was never a penal institution
established for remoulding the thoughts of prisoners. Before the rise of the
Kuomintang in 1927, detention was used as the only means to punish communists
agitating strikes and demonstrations in the Settlement. Therefore, interference from
Tangpu members damaged the judicial independence of the International Settlement.
Moreover, the tolerance of the municipal council on inhumane treatments of the
Soochow reformatory also violated western penal traditions. Inside the municipal
gaol, adult prisoners and juvenile males were well-respected physically and mentally.
Even political offenders were permitted to read and learn with loose restrictions.
Nevertheless, political indoctrinations in Chinese reformatories contradicted to
humanitarian ideas advocated by many westerners. The tolerance of the Shanghai
Municipal Council on this issue was a compromise in response to the rise of the
466

“Dispatch written from R.J. Ryan (Municipal Advocate) to J. R. Jones (Secretary General), 1 st
February, 1933”, in Shanghai Municipal Council, [Shanghai Municipal Council’s decision concerning
the treatment of anti-revolutionary prisoners who would be released on expiry of their term of
sentence under the jurisdiction of 2nd Branch Kiangsu High Court] in Secretariat Files of Shanghai
Municipal Council, 1919-1930
467
Huhua 胡華 ed., Zhonggong Dangshi Renwuzhuan 《中共黨史人物傳》Biographies of the
Chinese Communist, vol. 13 (Xi'an 西安: Shaanxi ren min chu ban she : Shaanxi sheng xin hua shu
dian fa xing, 陜西人民出版社 Shanxi people's publisher, 1980-1992), 329
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Kuomintang in China.
Last but not least, the role of the British Foreign Office was also remarkable in this
incident. Although there was no evidence showing direct British interventions in the
issue on reformatory, the rendition agreement and the positive comment made by the
British military officer on the Jiujiang reformatory demonstrated the recognition of
the British government on the Regulations Governing Reformatory.
This chapter showed how the British government readjusted its imperial policies in
China by integrating Settlement jails into a part of the Chinese prison system. As a
result, Britain’s economic interests could survive at the expense of the judicial and
penal independence of the Settlement in the 1930s.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The main theme of this thesis is to reveal readjustments of British imperial policies
in Shanghai between 1920s and the 1930s. In order to retain its economic influence
in China, Britain had to pacify the Kuomintang through withdrawing its protections
from British expatriates in Shanghai. The legal autonomy of the Settlement was
largely infringed. Therefore, I argue that decolonisation took place in Shanghai
during the inter-war period. It was because British settlers could no longer exercise
their western legal values in Shanghai. Consequently, British legal supremacy in
China almost came to an end.
Indeed, there was no doubt that the Shanghai Municipal Police had become “a
trustworthy ally” of the Nationalist government by 1927 not only by participating in
arrests, but also by sacrificing their legal authority in the forms of prosecution,
extradition, and penal power. Similar to what Georgina Sinclair observes in other
colonial police forces during the post-war period, most of the frontline officers of the
municipal police were very collaborative with the Chinese government to apprehend
communists. This was because their main obligation was to retain the existence of
foreign interests in the Settlement. As the intelligence department of the Shanghai
Municipal Police, the Special Branch coordinated arrests between their colleagues
and the Chinese authorities, targeting communists hiding inside the Settlement.
During many arrests, both the Settlement and Chinese authorities violated the
Chinese criminal procedures as many of the arrest orders were executed based on
suspicions and provisional requests from the Chinese intelligence departments.
Details stated in court warrants were largely ignored. Perhaps, some police officers in
the settlement may believe that only by violating formal legal procedures could they
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suppressed communist disturbances effectively. Yet, this did not mean that the
municipal police obtained greater power in policing Shanghai. Instead, the
Kuomintang was the authority in deciding who should be arrested and what actions
should be carried out according to its interpretation on different communists.
However, British settlers outside the police network felt frustrated to go against
unreasonable demands raised by the Chinese. They were very helpless when they
knew the British Foreign Office did not stand by them in the issues on extradition
and reformatory. Attempting to uphold the legal procedures of the Settlement, British
expatriates in Shanghai failed to secure diplomatic supports from the British
authorities. In fact, the British diplomatic bodies had begun to revise the judicial
regulations of the International Settlement with the Kuomintang since 1927.
Subsequently, British expatriates were deprived of many legal privileges in the
Settlement court. In 1929, knowing that the council tried to protect their Chinese
bona fide residents on suspicion of joining communist activities, British officials
pushed hard to persuade council to relinquish its protections offered to these Chinese
in order not to offend the Kuomintang. The British Minister to China Sir Miles
Lampson even visited Shanghai and explained Britain’s policies to the Chairman of
the council. The Shanghai Municipal Council therefore had to extradite any people to
China if there was sufficient evidence found. Later, Lampson and his colleagues
decided not to interfere in the case of the Noulen couple even though it was within
jurisdiction of the Settlement court. Moreover, the link established between the
Shanghai Municipal Gaol and the Soochow Reformatory also contradicted to the
humanitarian values possessed by the council and British pressure groups. Political
indoctrinations imposed on prisoners in the Soochow reformatory were utterly
unacceptable in the eyes of many westerners. Interference of Kuomintang party
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members in deciding who should be sent to the reformatory also damaged the
judicial independence of the Settlement. However, the municipal council still had to
follow the rules stated in the Chinese prison regulation due to the fact that the
settlement abided by the rendition agreement signed between Britain and China in
1930. British expatriates in the council had been abandoned by their sovereign state
by the late 1920s. Thence, readjustments of British imperial policies in China could
explain why the Council faithfully implemented the unreasonable instructions given
by the Kuomintang in communist cases in spite of their reluctances.
I also argue that the periodisation of the British decolonisation could be dated back
to the 1920s. China’s infringement on the judicial independence of the Shanghai
International Settlement was an important and vigorous case study to compensate the
limitations of Bickers’ argument. It is because this case showed the intrusion of
Chinese influence was not only in commercial and evangelical sectors, but also in
judicial system of the Settlement. Even in a political level, the Kuomintang’s
influence was not just restricted to those Chinese members appointed in the Shanghai
Municipal Council. The Chinese government also affected the treatments of their
political enemies seeking refuge in the Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Council
was forced to extradite its convicts to the Kuomintang and to transfer its prisoners to
Chinese reformatories. The tolerance of the Council and its police force on the
infringement of the judicial independence in the Settlement was actually far beyond
the aim of the municipal police for maintaining internal security in the Settlement.
Most importantly, they accepted such fate accompli mainly because they had to
satisfy the political incentives of the Kuomintang government. Thence, the
International Settlement inevitably became a part of policing networks of the
Nationalist government in China during the Nanjing decade. Political offenders
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incarcerated in the municipal gaol were either encouraged or forced to continue their
sentences in the Soochow Reformatory. They experienced several years of sufferings
by intensive political indoctrinations. Worse still, people regarded by the
Kuomintang as important communist convicts would be immediately extradited from
the municipal police to the Chinese authorities. Many of them were eventually
executed by different organisations affiliated with the Kuomintang. Also, it was
sometimes extremely difficult to prove whether people were engaged in “communist
activities” because membership was always personal, private and subjective. Having
no ideas in whether suspects threatened “the internal safety of the Republic of China”,
the Shanghai Municipal Police could only follow the comments and evidence
provided by the Chinese authorities in many cases. Assisted by the Shanghai
Municipal Police, the Kuomintang was able to effectively suppress the spread of
communism not only in Chinese territory, but also in the International Settlement.
It was not until in 1937 that the cooperation between the Settlement and Chinese
authorities terminated when Jiang Jieshi was forced to ally with the Chinese
Communist Party as a result of the Xian incident 西安事變 and the Japanese
invasion in China. The Kuomintang began to release communists imprisoned in
Chinese reformatories by mid-1937. Later, Chinese territory in Shanghai was even
occupied by Japanese troops after Kuomintang’s defeat in the Battle of Shanghai in
November 1937. The collaboration between the Settlement and the Chinese
authorities to arrest communists in Shanghai eventually came to a halt. Besieged by
Japanese forces for four years, two foreign concessions in Shanghai were also
annexed by Japan in December 1941 when the Pacific finally broke out.
The elimination of communist activities in Shanghai would pave the way for
consolidating the Kuomintang’s power. In my opinion, the loss of the judicial
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autonomy in the Settlement was as important as the transfer of political sovereignty
from Britain to its colonial subjects during the post-war era. Therefore, it is hoped
that my research can contribute to the academia by suggesting that the beginning of
the British decolonisation in Asia is dated back to the 1920s in Shanghai.
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APPENDIX 1
MAP OF THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT IN THE 1935468
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http://maps.bpl.org/id/m8780, accessed on 31st July, 2015
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APPENDIX 2
CORE MEMBERS OF THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL IN THE EARLY
1940s469

469

Robert Bickers, Britain in China, 160
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APPENDIX 3
SCENE NEAR LOUZA POLICE STATION 老閘巡捕房 IN NANKING ROAD AFTER
THE MAY THIRTIETH MOVEMENT IN 1925470
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https://sikhsinshanghai.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/adelaide-chronicle-1925.jpg?w=656&h=436 ,
accessed on 31st August, 2015
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APPENDIX 4
RESERVE UNIT (RIOT SQUAD) OF THE SMP AND THEIR “RED MARIAS”471
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https://scontent.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-xpf1/v/t1.0-9/1896732_788265961217416_56534409297666
77593_n.jpg?oh=780643d3f5195ed23f6d1f0be54ef540&oe=564E20D7, accessed on 31st July, 2015
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APPENDIX 5
TRIAL IN THE SHANGHAI INTERNATIONAL MIXED COURT IN THE LATE 19th
CENTURY OR EARLY 20th CENTURY472

472

Note a consular deputy sits next to the Chinese judge in the court proceeding.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/28/International_Mixed_Court_at_Shangh
ai7.jpg/800px-International_Mixed_Court_at_Shanghai7.jpg , accessed on 31st August, 2015
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APPENDIX 6
PORTRAIT OF CHIEF DETECTIVE INSPECTOR PAT GIVENS473

473

http://robertbickers.net/2015/02/17/what-shall-we-call-chiang-kai-shek, accessed on 31st July,
2015
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APPENDIX 7
A WARRANT SAMPLE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST SPECIAL AREA
IN SHANGHAI474

474

Warrant No. 1300 issued by Judge Feng at the request of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau 6th
February, 1934 in “Return For Cancellation Of Warrants Nos. 1300 And 1301”, ref. D5675, Shanghai
Municipal Police Investigation Files, 1894-1944
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APPENDIX 8
FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN13/4/27 AND
23-6-27

475

Date

Arrests

Charge

How Dealt With

13-4-27

1

Intimidation

40 days imprisonment

14-4-27

1

Inciting to strike &

5 months imprisonment

threatening to murder
11-4-27

1

Selling communist

Cautioned 12-4-27

newspaper
28-4-27

1

Distributing

Handed over to Chinese

inflammatory handbills

Authorities

29-4-27

11

Suspected Communists

Do

30-4-27

6

Do

Do

8-5-27

3

Do

Do

10-5-27

2

Do

Do

13-5-27

3

Do

Do

25-5-27

1

Do

Do

25-5-27

1

Intimidation

6 months impri.

13-6-27

6

Suspected communists

Handed over to Chinese
Authorities

23-6-27

5

Do

Do

24-6-27

6

Do

Do

8-7-27

4

Do

To be released on Ching
Hwa Shing Shoe
makers Shop signing
bond 14-7-27

19-7-27

1

Do

Handed over to Chinese
Authorities 20-7-27

23-7-27

2

Do

Do

27-7-27

4

Do

Do

28-7-27

2

Do

Do

4-8-27

1

Do

Do
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“Letter written by E.I.M. Barret to the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, 29th February,
1928” in communist activities in Settlement in Shanghai Municipal Council, 上海公共租界工部局
總辦處關於共產黨活動：牛蘭案, 1928-1932 Communist activities: The case of Noulen, ref.:
U1-3-3434, in Secretariat Files of Shanghai Municipal Council, 1919-1930 (Shanghai: Unpublished
document stored in Shanghai Municipal Archive).
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10-8-27

10

Do

9 dismissed owing to
lack of evidence. 1 to be
detained for 6 months at
the deer of Hope.

10-8-27

1

Do

Accused to be released
of personal bond for
good behaviour

21-8-27

1

Distributing

10 months impri.

communistic handbills
23-6-27

5

Posting communistic

18 months each,

posters

22-10-27
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APPENDIX 9
FIGURES SHOWING EXTRADITION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT TO CHINESE TERRITORY BETWEEN 23/8/27 AND
21-2-28
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Date

Arrests

Charge

How Dealt With

23-8-27

1

Possession of

10 months’

Communistic literature

imprisonment, 22-12-27

Printing of

9 months’

Communistic literature

imprisonment, 25-11-27

Possession of

Handed over to Chinese

Communistic literature

Authorities

Posting of Communist

4 years and 6 months

Posters

each

Possession of

1st one year & 4 months,

Communistic literature

2nd dismissed

5-9-27

13-10-27

8-11-27

22-11-27

3

1

2

2

24-11-27

3

Intimidation

14 months each

23-11-27

1

Possession of

6 months, 6-12-27

Communistic literature
27-11-27

2

Intimidation

14 months each

6-12-27

4

Do

2 fined $30 or 30 days
impt., 2 fined $20 or 20
days impt.

19-12-27

2

Do

3 months each or $100

22-12-27

1

Intimation & inciting to

7.5 years, 17-1-28

murder
23-12-27

1

Intimidation &

5.5 years. 17-1-28

distributing pamphlets
6-1-28

2

Intimidation

Withdrawn

6-1-28

1

Distributing Handbills

Fined $10 or 10 days
impt.

7-1-27

1

Intimidation

Fined $20 or 20 days
impt.

12-1-28

2

Do

Cautioned and released

11-1-28

2

Do

Fined $20 each

476
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13-1-28

2

Do

4 months each

20-2-28

1

Do

Dismissed

17-2-28

12

Suspected Communists

Handed over to
Garrison Commander
for trail

20-2-28

2

Do

Do

21-2-28

3

Do

Do
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APPENDIX 10
NEWSPAPER CUTTING SHOWING OPPOSITION OF CONSULAR DEPUTY IN A
CASE INVOLVED A RESIDENT OF THE SETTLEMENT IN THE LATE 1920s477

477

The North-China herald and market report, 13th August, 1927, 276
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APPENDIX 11
PORTRAIT OF HILAIRE NOULENS (ALSO KNOWN AS JAKOB RUDNIK) AND HIS
WIFE IN CHINESE JAIL IN 1937478

478

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/Jakob_Rudnik_and_his_wife.jpg , ,
accessed on 31st August, 2015
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APPENDIX 12
CONDITIONS INSIDE THE SOOCHOW REFORMATORY479

479

Xu Jingzong 徐景宗, Jiangsu Fanxingyuan 江蘇反省院 (Soochow Reformatory) in Liangyou
《良友》 The companion pictorial, No.102 (Shanghai: Liangyou Tushu Gongsi 良友圖書公司
Companion publisher company limited , 1935), 11
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